Courts as Forums For Protest
Professor Jules Lobel*
For almost half a century, scholars, judges and politicians have debated two competing
models of the judiciary’s role in a democratic society. The mainstream model views courts as
arbiters of disputes between private individuals asserting particular rights.1 As former Reagan
Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried wrote, “courts should be the impartial tool for
doing justice between man and man.”2
The reform upsurge of the 60s and 70s witnessed a transformation in the role of the
judiciary, particularly the federal judiciary. Courts were now often viewed not merely as forums
to settle private disputes, but as instruments of societal change. Harvard Professor Abram
Chayes termed the emerging model one of “public law litigation.”3 This new model emphasized
the court’s power to remedy structural, constitutional or statutory violations; as Professor Chayes
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-2put it: “the centerpiece of the emerging public law model is the decree.”4 The difference
in relief between the two models was not itself decisive, what was fundamental to the
new conception was the judiciary’s role in implementing social change and not simply
ordering private relationships. As one prominent critic perceived it, the new model urged
that lawsuits “be recast so they would not just be disputes between individuals over their
particular grievances, but political struggles in which judges could reorder whole
institutions and change the fundamental nature of society.”5
The ongoing debate between these two views of the judicial role has obscured a
third model of the role of courts in a democratic society; a model that has been ignored
by legal scholars and viewed as illegitimate by some courts. That third, alternative
perspective views courts as forums for protest. Under this model, courts not only
function as adjudicators of private disputes, or institutions that implement social reforms,
but as arenas in which political and social movements utilize to agitate for and educate
about their legal and political agenda.
While victory is an important index of success in the first two views of the role of
litigation, winning in court is not salient in the forums of protest model. Of course, the
litigators and their clients certainly hope, and at times expect to win in court; but their
objective is broader than courtroom victory. They primarily seek neither the damages
awarded to private litigators under the traditional model, nor the injunction of the public

4

Chayes, supra note 3, at 1298. But see Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1982) (noting that it is the
nature of the controversy, the sources of the governing law, and the consequent impact of
the decision–rather than the form of relief–that differentiate public law from private law
adjudication).
5

FRIED, supra note 2, at 16.

-3law model, but rather to use the courtroom struggle to build a political movement. The
litigation can serve a variety of roles: to articulate a constitutional theory supporting the
aspirations of the political movement, to expose the conflict between the aspirations of
law and its grim reality, to draw public attention to the issue and to mobilize an oppressed
community, or to put public pressure on a recalcitrant government or private institution to
take a popular movement’s grievances seriously. What is decisive is that judicial relief
not be viewed as dispositive: such relief is important but not the driving force of the
litigation.
This model thus breaks down the traditional barrier between law and politics, but
in a fundamentally different way than the law reform model. The traditional model
attempts to shield the judicial process from the supposedly unsavory influence of politics,
while the law reform model views politics as a necessary predicate to the courtroom
drama. In this third model, the relationship between law and politics is reversed: a
significant point of many of the cases is to inspire political action. The legal struggle is
thus a part of a broader political campaign, not the engine of change itself. Courts are not
the prime movers of social change, they are one forum in which the struggle for societal
change takes place. Even when public interest lawsuits prevail in court, often their most
lasting legacy is not the relief ordered by the court, but the lawsuit’s contribution to the
ongoing community discourse about an important public issue.
Some courts have questioned whether litigation brought for the purpose of
provoking public dialogue and debate is legitimate. For example, the Appeals for the
District of Columbia imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the attorneys for fifty-five Libyan
citizens and residents who sued for damages resulting from the 1986 United States air

-4strike on Libya.6 Although the District Court found that plaintiffs’ counsel, including the
former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, “surely knew” that “the case
offered no hope whatsoever of success,” and that it had been “brought as a public
statement of protest” against President Reagan’s actions,7 it declined to impose Rule 11
sanctions because federal courts “serve in some respects as a forum for making such
statements, and should continue to do so.”8 The court of appeals, however, held that Rule
11 sanctions were warranted because “[w]e do not conceive it a proper function of a
federal court to serve as a forum for ‘protests.’”9
Commentators have criticized the court of appeals’ decision.10 Yet even some
forceful critics agree that courts do not exist as public forums.11 But as this Article
demonstrates, from the early history of the American Republic onward, political
movements have used courts to further public debate on important constitutional issues.
Indeed, as one commentator has noted, a “considerable amount of civil rights litigation”
is in some sense a “public statement of protest.”12

6

Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Buckley,
Ginsburg, and Sentelle), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).
7

Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 1988).

8

Id.

9

Saltany, 886 F.2d at 440.

10

Anthony D’Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims Arising
From the U.S. Air Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1990); Carl Tobias, Rule 11
Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 26 VILL. L. REV. 105, 118-19 (1991).
11

D’Amato, supra note 10, at 706.

12

Tobias, supra note 10, at 119.

-5In recent years, groups at both ends of the legal and political spectrum have used
courts as arenas to provoke public education. The lawsuit now pending before the United
States Supreme Court challenging the Bush Administration’s detention of prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has as an important goal sparking national and international
outcry against these unlawful detentions.13 African American activists have filed
reparations lawsuits against corporations whose histories are entangled with slavery, as
well as the United States government, seeking to generate “societal discussion” about the
role commercial entities and the government played in the slave trade and slavery.14
Lawyers for Haitian refugees challenged various aspects of the Coast Guard’s
interdiction and return of Haitian refugees,15 with an important goal being to keep the
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-6refugee issue alive politically.16 During the Vietnam War, countless lawsuits were filed
with an aim to focus the public on the unconstitutional nature of the U.S. war in
Indochina,17 and more recent wars have inspired similar lawsuits.18
Conservative political groups and individuals have also attempted to use the
courts as forums to generate public attention over particular issues. The backers of the
Paula Jones case undoubtedly brought and continued that litigation to advance
conservative political causes and embarrass President Clinton.19 Anti-abortion activists
have supported legislation, concluding that even if they lose the ensuing court challenge
over its constitutionality, that battle would be valuable in educating the American people
to their point of view on abortion.20 Gun owners have used the courts to get public
attention to their Second Amendment concerns.21
Recognizing the legitimacy of litigation brought to spark public debate on an
issue, to galvanize a political movement or to spotlight social injustice would have
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-7several important impacts on courts, lawyers, and social movements. First, it requires
narrowing the judicial definition of frivolous or improper litigation subject to Rule 11
sanctions. More importantly, accepting this perspective requires litigants and lawyers to
assess the appropriateness of a given legal strategy not solely by the likelihood of success
in court, but also by the role it plays in advancing a popular movement.22 Most
fundamentally it requires looking at law reform litigation and often even private litigation
in terms of its interaction and interface with political movements and not as an isolated
legal struggle. This perspective not only brings politics the courtroom, but drags the
courtroom into the outside political world.
Part I of this article contrasts the traditional and structural reform model of
litigation with what I term the Public Forum Model of Law Reform Litigation. Part II
demonstrates that this type of litigation has a lengthy pedigree in American history. Part
III focuses on the First Amendment values promoted by this form of litigation and the
protection it should be accorded. Part IV addresses the implications of this analysis for
how judges might address the tensions between judicial articulation of norms and
enforcement of those norms that are ever-present in law reform litigation and form an
important area of controversy over the public law model. Part V will evaluate the
broader implications for lawyers and their clients of using courts in the fashion,
evaluating the pitfalls and advantages of such a use of litigation and the possible tensions
between law and politics it raises.
I.

Law Reform Litigation and the Courts as Forums for Protest Model
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-8The successful law reform litigation of the 1950s and 60s spawned an ongoing
debate among scholars over the legitimacy and efficacy of judicially imposed reforms.
Legal scholars focused on the legitimacy of this litigation. In seminal articles, Professor
Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss argued that structural, public law litigation was displacing
the traditional dispute resolution lawsuit as the dominant form of adjudication in the late
twentieth century.23 The traditional model of adjudication posited a bipolar conflict
between individual private parties before a neutral, detached, mostly passive judge to
determine whether a legal right had been violated and damages should be awarded. The
point of such a lawsuit was to decide a concrete grievance or dispute, not to address some
general problem of public policy.
The public structural lawsuit on the other hand contained a multiplicity of parties
and interests, often taking the form of a class action. It was not a dispute about private
rights, but rather over issues of public policy. The fact inquiry was not simply
retrospective but predictive and thus quasi-legislative. Most important, the judge was not
a passive, detached arbiter, but rather an active agent who shaped and organized the
litigation to ensure a just and workable outcome. The relief imposed was not damages
but an injunctive decree that often required ongoing judicial supervision.24 The function
of this structural, public lawsuit was not to accord damages for a discrete private wrong,
but rather to change the behavior of a large bureaucratic organization.
Both Chayes and Fiss viewed the rise of the structural lawsuit as linked to the
development of a regulatory, administrative bureaucratic state. The dispute resolution
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-9model was based on a system of autonomous, individual entrepreneurs operating in the
largely unregulated marketplace; the structural reform lawsuit reflects a world in which
the state, corporations and large bureaucracies play dominant roles. In this modern
world, the role of federal courts was transformed from primarily solving private disputes,
to policing the interface between large state institutions, such as schools, prisons, and
child welfare systems, and the citizenry.25
The legitimacy of the court’s role in restructuring institutions has come under
persistent attack. Some criticize the federal judiciary’s move away from concrete
“grievance answering” to more generalized problem solving.26 Alexander Bickel
complained that “All too many federal judges have been induced to view themselves as
holding roving commissions as problem solvers, and as charged with a duty to act when
majoritarian institutions do not.”27 Many viewed judges as grabbing the “imperial”
power to thwart the will of majoritarian, more democratic organs of government.28
The courts and Congress have also battled over the appropriateness of the reform
litigation. Justice Powells’ influential concurrence in United States v. Richardson
reflected the concerns of the Burger and Rehnquist Court regarding structural reform
litigation:29
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-10[Due] to what many have regarded as the unresponsiveness of the Federal
Government to recognized needs or serious inequities in our society,
recourse to the federal courts has attained an unprecedented popularity in
recent decades. Those courts have often acted as a major instrument of
social reform. . . . [w]e risk a progressive impairment of the effectiveness
of the federal courts if their limited resources are diverted increasingly
from their historic role to the resolution of public-interest suits brought by
litigants who cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all
citizens. . . . It merits noting how often and how unequivocally the Court
has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert the Judiciary into an open
forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the
performance of government.
Congress has fought over a host of proposals to limit federal courts jurisdiction to hear
and remedy institutional reform cases, and has enacted legislation to limit prison
litigation30 and to restrict the ability of Legal Services Lawyers to engage in class action
or other structural reform cases.31
While the traditional dispute resolution model of adjudication and its more recent
structural reform competitor are widely divergent, they have some basic similarities.
Both are jurocentric. They focus on the judge as the central actor in resolving disputes.
Fiss’ “conception of adjudication starts from the top—the office of the judge—and works
down. . . . At the core of structural reform is the judge, and his effort to give meaning to
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-11our public values.”32 So too, while the dispute resolution model accords the judge a more
passive role, it also is fundamentally concerned with defining the role of the judge.33 In
addition, both models see the judicial grant of relief as critical to the lawsuit, whether it
be the award of damages or the implementation of a decree.
Important, recent work of social scientists raises questions about both the
traditional legal model and its structural reform competitor. In the 1970s and 80s
political and social scientists engaged in a debate, parallel to the legal dispute, over the
legitimacy of law reform litigation. The social science discussion did not focus primarily
on the proper role of the courts or the competence of the judiciary to restructure political
or social institutions. Rather, social scientists debated the question of whether the
judiciary’s decisions really had the effect of changing society.
The publication of Gerald Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope sparked the debate.
Rosenberg argued that the federal courts—even in such celebrated cases as Brown v.
Board of Education and Roe v. Wade—were largely ineffectual—and perhaps even
counterproductive—in producing social change. Rosenberg concluded that “U.S. courts
can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform.”34 To Rosenberg
“courts act as a ‘fly paper’ for social reformers who succumb to the ‘lure of litigation.’”35
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-12Rosenberg’s conclusions have been challenged by a host of social scientists.
Most of these academics agree with Rosenberg that judicial decisions by themselves
rarely lead to social change, and that reliance on courts and judges often proves
counterproductive for political and social movements. These social scientists focused,
however, on the indirect effects of litigation. For scholars such as Michael McCann,
Stuart Schiengold and Joel Handler, who studied social movements, the indirect effects
and uses of litigation may be its most important aspect for social movements seeking
change.36 Social movements’ use of litigation to mobilize political struggles, to gain
favorable publicity, to build a political movement, to generate support for political and
constitutional claims and to provide leverage to supplement other tactics and force the
opposition to settle is the central thrust of these scholars’ work. This body of work
argues that “although the litigation by itself may not always produce immediate and
sweeping results, it can function as part of an effective political strategy for achieving
social reform.”37 Empirical studies in such disparate areas as pay equity reform
litigation,38 disability rights cases,39 school financial reform litigation,40 environmental
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-13and consumer litigation,41 or civil rights organizing42 have demonstrated the significant
indirect benefits that litigation can achieve for plaintiffs who use courts to mobilize
public sentiment or provide leverage for their claims. This social science research must
be integrated into the debate among legal scholars over the proper role of the federal
judiciary.
A.

The Courts as Forums for Protest Model

The work of these social scientists requires that legal scholars conceptualize an
alternative, third model of litigation, not to displace but to exist alongside the traditional
dispute resolution and law reform models. If the most important effect of even winning
law reform cases may not lie in the judicial relief awarded, but in the indirect effects of
the litigation on society, than a reconceptualization of the Chayes/Fiss law reform
paradigm is necessary.
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-14What I term the Courts as Forums for Protest model would have several key
characteristics that would distinguish it from both of the other two prominent paradigms.
1.

Winning or Losing in Court is Not as Important as Influencing the
Public Debate

The lawyers’ and plaintiffs’ interest in the lawsuit is not solely, nor at times even
primarily, winning or losing, but in getting their message out to the broader public or a
particular group. The lawsuit serves as a means for the plaintiffs and counsel to
transform the court into a forum to broadcast their point of view. While the plaintiffs do
have a legal claim that they believe is valid and they want the court to decide, they also
want to use the litigation as a vehicle for their protest, as a catalyst for aiding or
developing a broader social movement.
The efficacy of lawsuits in generating publicity has been well documented. Many
social scientists have observed “that litigation is one of the most effective ways to win
publicity for a cause.”43 Public interest litigators and organizations have come to view
litigation as a vehicle of attracting the media. Reflecting this recognition, it is now a
common practice to announce a pending or filed public interest lawsuit by means of a
press conference.44 Often litigation attracts the media’s attention in a way that nothing
else does.45 Professor Joel Handler concluded that in general “a 20 page complaint and a
temporary injunction are worth more than a 300 page report in the media.”46 Professor
43
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-15Handler discusses a category of litigation he studied where “the tactic that distinguishes
these cases is that the law reformers do not expect to achieve results through court or
administrative order: such proceedings take too long or become too costly . . . . Rather,
they use legal proceedings to generate harmful publicity that will force the discriminator
into a settlement.”47
The educational value of litigation is often substantial even where the case does
not result in a legal victory. Professor McMann demonstrates that pay equity advocates
used lawsuits as a “crucial organizing tool,” and that for many of the activists “whether
you win or lose [in court], awareness rises through this type of action.”48 For McCann,
while the pay equity litigation resulted in only modest policy reforms, perhaps the single
most important achievement of the movement was the transformations in many working
women’s consciousness, understanding and commitments.49 Similarly, Professor Richard
Gambiatta studied the impact of the school finance case that lost in the Supreme Court
and concluded that the impact of the litigation nevertheless influenced the legislative
agenda. Thus even ultimately defeated litigation “can recast the nature of a debate,
facilitate debates that otherwise may not occur, thus setting in motion, at times, the
process of policy change.”50
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-16This social science research is buttressed by the experience of the bar. For
example, William Colby, the Cruzan family’s attorney in their famous “right-to-die case”
that lost in the Supreme Court explained:
The public discourse surrounding the cases quickly took on a life of its
own. The true legacy of the two cases is that they caused [the country] to
talk about death, dying, living wills, hospital ethics committees, and the
withdrawal of futile medical treatment and who should make that decision.
This nationwide discussion very quickly outgrew the individual lawsuits
of two young girls involved in car accidents.51
Similarly, Yale Professor Harold Koh’s experience in transnational public law
litigation led him to view such litigation “as a development whose success should be
measured not by favorable judgments, but by practical results: the norms declared, the
political pressure generated, the government practices abated, and the lives saved.”52 For
Koh, even “adverse Supreme Court decisions are no longer final stops, but only way
stations, in the process of ‘complex enforcement . . . .’”53
The recent litigation involving the suspected Taliban and Al Qaida prisoners
indefinitely detained by the Bush Administration at the U.S. military installation at
Guantanamo Bay without any legal process is but another example. Until recently, the
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-17lower courts had uniformly rejected prisoners’ petitions for habeas corpus relief.
Nonetheless, the litigation received a significant amount of press attention and helped
keep the issue in the public eye for almost two years. Now the Supreme Court has taken
the case and will hear it this year. But whether they win or lose in the Supreme Court,
the plaintiffs have already achieved a key goal of focusing public attention on the
government’s policy.
2.

A Non-Jurocentic Model of Litigation

As already noted, both the traditional dispute resolution model and the
Chayes/Fiss structural or reform model of litigation focused on the role of the judge. The
recent social science research has concentrated not on the top-down model of judges
dispensing decisions to the litigants, but on a more bottom-up, decentralized model that
analyzes the interaction between the parties to the litigation and their interface with
society. From this perspective, the judge and judicial decision or judicial decree are not
the epicenter of litigation, from which all else radiates. Rather “social struggles
themselves thus define the center of analysis and nonjudicial actors are viewed as
practical legal agents rather than as simply reactors to judicial command.”54
The diminished role of the judge in this decentralized, bottom up-model is
inextricably connected to the lessened concern over winning and losing in court. If the
role of the court is reconceptualized from authoritative law givers to that of a forum
whereby grievances and complaints can be aired and argued, the critical question for the
litigation is not what the eventual decree or decision states, but how the litigation affects
the various actors in the policy arena—whether those actors are the public in general,
54
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-18interest groups, legislative bodies, a group the litigants are seeking to organize, or the
defendants whom the plaintiffs are seeking to force to the bargaining table. As one
commentator has argued, the question for many areas of litigation is “not how do judges
make policy, but rather how courts function as an arena of policy disputation.”55
Even when plaintiffs win in court, it is a mistake to view the judge as the central
actor in the implementation of relief. Rather, one must recognize the interdependence of
the courts, media, activists and other branches of government to achieve meaningful
reform.56
Legal scholars focus primarily on analyzing judicial decisions: critiquing,
rationalizing, legitimating, deconstructing them. Yet by focusing so extensively and
centrally on judicial decisions and the role of the judge, legal scholars risk missing the
larger picture. That broader view is that judicial decisions represent only one incident in
what is a rich, variegated and lengthy process of resolving a grievance or public dispute.
By focusing narrowly on the decision instead of the entire process, legal scholars fail to
understand the broader landscape.
Often real cases will present elements of both the forum for protest and
institutional reform model, for as with any model, reality is always more complex and
intricate than any theoretical or doctrinal formulation. Thus in many cases, litigants who
seek to utilize courts to educate the public and mobilize their social and political
movements will also be demanding strong judicial intervention to which they should be
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-19entitled to remedy an aggregious constitutional violation. Moreover, while certain cases
may present the forum for protest model in its pure form, much public interest litigation
has as a purpose furthering public education and discourse and in many cases the
courtroom battle is but one aspect of a broader political struggle. That many public law
litigants have interests in the litigation that extend beyond winning or losing in the
courtroom has important implications for lawyers’ strategies and tactics in litigating those
cases and for judical responses to the litigation as part of a multi-faceted political
struggle.
B.

The Legitimacy of This Model

The model proposed here, however efficacious and widespread in public law
litigation raises the question whether these kind of cases and legal strategies are
legitimate uses of the courtroom and litigation. Several types of problems appear
immediately. The first is whether a litigation strategy that seeks favorable publicity to
further a social movement is an ethical and legitimate use of courts. Second, and related,
are such purposes an improper purpose under Rule 11.
For the past century lawyers and judges have debated the proper role of the
lawyer in obtaining favorable media publicity. For example, in 1964, a committee of the
American Bar Association concluded that the proper role of the lawyer “is to present his
case in the courtroom . . . not attempting to build a favorable climate of public opinion.”57
Various courts have also opined at times that obtaining publicity is not a legitimate
function of litigation. For example, the Fourth Circuit recently denied attorney fees for
public relations work by attorneys in concluding a successful civil rights action, stating
57
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-20that “the legitimate goals of litigation are almost always attained in the courtroom not in
the media.”58
The same unease over the use of publicity in connection with litigation has also
affected some law reform organizations. Felix Frankfurter, then a member of the
ACLU’s Executive Committee, criticized ACLU Executive Director Roger Baldwin’s
distribution of a circular criticizing the government’s impending prosecution of a
communist labor leader. Frankfurter objected to this attempt to influence public
sentiment, arguing that the case must be tried in the courts, not in the press or in a
publicity campaign. The ACLU Executive Committee eventually adopted Frankfurter’s
position, “both from a standpoint of effective tactics and general principle.”59
Federal courts have also at times imposed Rule 11 sanctions on attorneys who
have used the courtroom as a forum for public protest. The D.C. Circuit’s imposition of
sanctions against former Attorney General Ramsey Clark for what it termed his attempt
to use the federal court as a forum for protest in bringing claims on behalf of Libyans
killed or injured during the 1986 bombing is but one example.60 Another is the sanctions
imposed by the Fourth Circuit against the prominent civil rights attorney William
Kunstler and other attorneys. The Circuit affirmed a district court imposition of Rule 11
sanctions because Kunstler had filed a civil rights lawsuit with a primary purpose of
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-21seeking publicity and embarrassing the defendant.61 The Court found that sanctions are
appropriate even where a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, as long as the
litigant’s central purpose in bringing the lawsuit is “improper,” such as seeking
publicity.62
Commentators have criticized Saltany and Kunstler,63 other courts have disagreed
that political education is an improper purpose,64 and Rule 11 was amended in 1993 to
make it more difficult to impose sanctions on litigants and their attorneys. Nonetheless,
the present Rule 11 still bars pleadings filed for “any improper purpose.” That text
suggests that a court could sanction a complaint filed for the purpose of seeking publicity,
even if the primary purpose of the litigation were to vindicate rights.65 These Rule 11
cases, the text of the rule, and the controversy over the ethical propriety of lawyers
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-22obtaining favorable media publicity for their clients, illustrate the deep seated doubts in
some sections of the legal community about the propriety and legitimacy of the role for
the courts being proposed in this article.

-23Legitimacy is fundamentally a function of several interrelated inquiries. The first
is historical: whether within our historical tradition federal courts have played a role as
forums for protest? The second is theoretical and doctrinal: does such a function of
courts and litigation fit comfortably within our constitutional structure?
II.

The History of Litigation as a Forum for Protest in America

-24Unlike structural reform litigation, which is a relatively new mid 20th century
phenomena, the tradition of using litigation as a forum for protest to obtain favorable
publicity for a political cause dates back even before the American revolution. James
Otis spoke publicly about the British abuses involving the writs of assistance, and his
arguments in the case challenging those writs were widely publicized, including his
famous speech, of which John Adams later wrote, “Then and there was the child
independence born.”66 When Adams represented John Hancock and others in the tax
protests in Boston, he and his colleagues at the bar worked closely with the press to
publicize the abuses of the British and make the issue public. Adams’ contentions and
later a text of his argument were thoroughly aired in the press, along with commentaries
on the important legal issues.67 Indeed, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion
that Adams intended his argument in that case to “serve a purpose beyond mere advocacy
in court.”68 Both the content and use of the draft argument suggests that it was as much a
political as legal document.69 These revolutionary lawyers were using their cases not
merely to defend their clients, but to help build a political movement for American
independence.
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-25The revolutionary tradition pre-independence of using the Courts as a forum for
protest was continued by the abolitionist movement in the early 19th century. Historian
Hendrik Hartog has noted that the “contest over slavery did more than any other cause to
stimulate the development of an alternate rights conscious, interpretation of the federal
Constitution.”70 Much of the fugitive slave litigation was geared not merely to winning
in court, but to galvanizing northern public opinion against slavery. The lawyer who best
used litigation to further a political agenda and spark public debate over slavery was
Salmon Chase. Chase engaged in such political litigation on behalf of fugitive slaves and
their underground railroad supporters for more than a decade, eventually using it as a
springboard to become a U.S. Senator, Secretary of the Treasury under Lincoln and
ultimately Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Chase’s life was driven by the tension between ambition and moral principles.71
The Republican Party orator Carl Schurz noted in 1860 that he had never met a man more
“possessed by the desire to be President.”72 Abraham Lincoln reportedly remarked in
1864 that “Chase is about one and a half times bigger than any other man I ever knew,”
probably a reference to both Chase’s ability and ego.73
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-26But Chase also held strongly felt moral principles that he acted upon, principles
that probably more than anything else denied him his ultimate ambition of becoming
President. A deeply religious man, Chase’s religious faith was the compelling motivation
behind Chase’s condemnation of and agitation against slavery.
In the mid 1830s both Chase and the abolitionist movement were at turning
points. Until then, abolitionism had been mainly a moral and religious crusade that
sought to abolish slavery by means of moral persuasion, not legal or political action.
Anti-slavery societies often resolved to use “no weapon but reason and truth” in their
campaign against slavery.74 Antislavery litigation was utilized mainly as a “practical
necessity” to defend abolitionists against mobs and riots, not as an ideological
opportunity.75 But reason and truth had not worked. Southerners had not been moved by
moral persuasion to end slavery, and by the 1830s, political abolitionists like James
Birney were developing constitutional theories that would provide legal and political
means for challenging slavery.
On March 10, 1837, a troubled James G. Birney appeared at Salmon Chase’s
office in Cincinnati. Birney, a former Alabama slave owner turned an abolitionist told
Chase a heart-wrenching tale that exposed the inhumanity and hypocrisy of slavery. His
maid, 20-year-old Matilda Lawrence, had accompanied her master and father Larkin
Lawrence to Cincinnati. When her father refused, her plea for freedom she ran away.
Her father briefly looked for her, then hired the notorious slave catcher John M. Riley to
find Matilda and return her to slavery.
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-27Riley located Matilda in March 1837 and she was arrested pursuant to the federal
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. Birney asked 29-year-old Chase to handle Matilda’s case.76
Chase agreed.
Chase’s decision would begin a long crusade earning him the nickname “Attorney
General for Runaway Slaves,”77 and, though it resulted in mostly losing cases and very
few freed slaves, it would catapult both Chase and the slavery issue to national
prominence. In time, Chase would become the anti-slavery leader most responsible for
the successful transition from moral outrage to political action. As the New York
Tribune later would write, “To Mr. Chase more than any other one man belongs the
credit of making the anti-slavery feeling, what it had never been before, a power in
politics. It had been the sentiment of philanthropists, he made it the inspiration of a great
political party.”78 A significant part of that effort was Chase’s use of the courts as a
forum for presenting his anti-slavery views.
Chase’s main strategy in his argument before Ohio Common Pleas Judge David
E. Estes seems to have been to use Matilda’s case to challenge the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. While he did raise a number of technical, legal arguments,
he discussed those quickly. Chase focused instead on broader constitutional points of
natural rights, federalism, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. He did so over the
objection of opposing counsel and clear signals from the judge that Chase’s discourse
76
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-28was not pertinent. His opening and closing arguments were attempts to infuse the
Constitution with broad natural rights and an egalitarian moral perspective. He
“perceived” the court’s responsibility as not merely to the individual and community,
“but to conscience and to God.”79
Judge Estes listened patiently to Chase, but quickly ruled against him based on the
current state of the law. Slave catcher Riley quickly rushed Matilda across the Ohio
River to Covington, Kentucky and eventually to New Orleans where Lawrence had
arranged for her sale.
The historian William Wiecik has termed Chase’s Matilda argument “a noble
failure.”80 Chase was saddened by the outcome of the case and felt that his legal position
had been “treated with ridicule or disregard.”81 Yet, despite Matilda’s personal tragedy,
Chase’s mentor Birney believed that the case had “done much for the cause in this
city.”82 The litigation had stirred considerable debate over fugitive slaves and slavery in
Cincinnati. It was clear that Chase’s argument was designed not merely to win before
Judge Estes, but to help spur a political movement against slavery. Birney and Chase in
the Matilda case had worked out the legal theory that, while losing in court, was
eventually to become the constitutional platform of the Republican Party.
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-29The Matilda case did not vanish with the unfortunate woman’s return to slavery.
Birney was prosecuted for harboring a fugitive slave, and was found guilty and fined.
Birney decided not to pay the fine and Chase filed an appeal. Chase quickly realized that
Judge Este had made a technical error when he charged the jury to consider only whether
Birney had harbored Matilda and not whether he did so knowing that she was a slave.
But both he and Birney agreed not to raise that issue on appeal, even though they knew
they would win if they did. Their interest lay in arguing the broad constitutional issue of
whether Matilda became free the moment she entered Ohio with her master, not in
“winning” the case and avoiding the fine.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision disappointed Chase. The Court reversed
Birney’s conviction, but only on the technical grounds not argued by Chase that the jury
had not considered whether Birney had known Matilda was a slave. Nonetheless, the
Ohio Supreme Court took the unusual step of ordering the publication of his arguments in
the case. In all likelihood the Court agreed with Chase’s arguments, but was unwilling to
adopt them in the Ohio political climate of the late 1830s. So it signaled its leanings by
having the argument printed and widely publicized.83
For the next decade, Chase actively represented fugitive slaves in Ohio courts.
His cases usually drew large crowds to the courtroom. Most of his efforts lost, although
occasionally he was able to win his client’s freedom. Most important to Chase, his
arguments were reaching a wider national audience, touching a chord with northerners
who wanted to dissociate free states from slavery.
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-30Chase’s most famous case stemmed from his representation of an abolitionist
involved in the underground railroad. His representation of John Van Zandt, particularly
his appeal to the Supreme Court, might be termed frivolous or baseless in modern
parlance. Yet, this case may have done more than any other of Chase’s cases to publicize
the theories and positions that were to motivate Northern public opinion to support a
political movement that eventually became the Republican Party.
On April 21, 1842, John Van Zandt, an old, stooped farmer who had left
Kentucky because of his hatred of slavery, was conducting nine fugitive slaves north
when his wagon was stopped by two slave catchers. The slave driving the wagon fled,
but the other eight were captured and rushed across the Ohio River to Covington,
Kentucky where their owner, Wharton Jones, reclaimed them and paid the slave catchers
$450.
Jones then sued Van Zandt for harboring fugitives in violation of the fugitive
slave act. Chase agreed to take Van Zandt’s case and—as usual in his anti-slavery
litigation—accepted no fee. He asked former U.S. Senator Thomas Morris to aid him in
the defense.
Chase was optimistic about the Van Zandt case. He recognized that whatever the
outcome in Court, the case would get wide publicity for his anti-slavery constitutional
views. Moreover, he thought he could win in court despite the substantial evidence that
Van Zandt was transporting slaves he knew to be fugitives.
Chase did have some good reasons to be optimistic about the Van Zandt case.
The case would be tried in federal court before Supreme Court Justice John McLean who
was assigned to the Ohio District. McLean, an impressive looking man whose features

-31and reserved demeanor resembled those of George Washington, had strong anti-slavery
views. McLean had ruled in favor of fugitive slaves when he was an Ohio Supreme
Court Justice and in 1842 had set forth his anti-slavery views in the U.S. Supreme Court
case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania. Moreover, McLean was Chase’s friend and soon to be
uncle-in-law. It would be hard to find a better federal judge to try the Van Zandt case.
Justice McLean rejected Chase’s motion to dismiss the case, and a jury ultimately
awarded Jones $1,200 damages. McLean believed that the duty to obey the law overrode
natural rights, his anti-slavery views, and individual conscience. He charged the jury:
In the course of this discussion much has been said of the laws of
nature, of conscience, and the rights of conscience. This monitor, under
great excitement, may mislead, and always does mislead, when it urges
anyone to violate the law.84
Chase moved for a new trial, continuing his by then increasingly futile
constitutional challenge to the fugitive slave law. McLean again decided against Chase.
While he agreed with Chase’s view of slavery and the presumption in Ohio that every
person was free, McLean’s view of the Constitution’s necessary compromise with slavery
made him object to Chase’s natural law argument and his appeal to conscience. To
McLean, the immorality of slavery was irrelevant. Repeating his charge to the jury:
“The law is our only guide.”85
Chase however remained undaunted and appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. His unbounded faith, combined with tremendous drive and ambition motivated
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-32him to articulate arguments that eventually moved thousands of northerners to view the
fugitive slave law as unconstitutional. But that faith did not move the Supreme Court.
After the Court unanimously ruled against Van Zandt, Chase wrote to the prominent NY
abolitionist Lewis Tappan that “I regret the decision in the Van Zandt case, and, I
confess, did not expect it.”86 If he did not, pretty much everyone else did.
But even Chase must have recognized that the chance of winning Van Zandt’s
appeal in the Supreme Court was minuscule. The Court’s 1842 Prigg v. Pennsylvania
decision rendered a constitutional attack on the Fugitive Slave Act futile.87 The only
Supreme Court Justice with anti-slavery views was Justice McLean, and he had already
ruled against Chase. Although McLean had urged the Court to hear oral argument in the
Van Zandt case, Chief Justice Taney objected to hearing oral argument for he thought the
constitutional question was already settled. Taney persuaded the rest of the Court except
McLean, and Chase was relegated to submitting only a written brief, an ominous sign.
Perhaps Chase subconsciously recognized that he could not win, for his Van Zandt brief
comes the closest he ever was to come to adopting a pure higher natural law theory. His
brief straddled the fine line between “urging the disregard of positive law and the
incorporation of natural law within it.”88 Chase’s argument was designed to test the limit
of law, to put before the country and the court the conflict between humanity and
prevailing law.
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-33The brief opened by tacitly admitting that current legal precedent might be against
him. Chase argued however, that “such authority may stand for law,” but does not
always represent the law. Reason and truth “will ultimately prevail.”89 Other wellestablished legal doctrines have been overturned in time, and Chase urged the Court to
consider his arguments dispassionately and openly. Fifty pages of technical legal
argument followed to prove that Van Zandt could not be liable unless the slave owner
actually notified him that the persons he was transporting were fugitive slaves. Chase’s
argument was logical, well-researched and persuasively argued: but his interpretation of
the law would have made it virtually impossible to prosecute underground railroaders: a
result neither the South nor the Supreme Court was willing to countenance.
If the first part of Chase’s argument was technically sound but clearly judicially
unattainable, the second half descended to utter futility. His argument that the Fugitive
Slave Act was unconstitutional defied legal precedent and current political reality. Yet
the brief brilliantly sets forth Chase’s anti-slavery constitutional philosophy. Future
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner considered Chase’s Van Zandt brief to be the best
he had ever read and borrowed Chase’s arguments when he condemned the fugitive slave
law in the Senate a few years later. “It is a triumph of freedom,” said retired Justice Story
of Chase’s argument, and accurately predicted that “his points will seriously influence the
public mind and perhaps the politics of the country.”90
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-34That was Chase’s aim. A biographer argues that Chase’s point “was simply to put
before the country a solemn protest against making the free States share in slavery.”91
Chase reprinted the brief as a pamphlet that he widely distributed to every member of
Congress, and other leading politicians irrespective of their views on slavery. The case
attracted national attention: Chase used the forum to publicize the anti-slavery cause and
help his own political ambitions. He had astutely secured the prominent Governor of
New York, William Henry Seward, to act as co-counsel in the Supreme Court, in order to
help the case achieve national prominence. Seward’s argument to the Court was also
published, in the New York Tribune.
Chase’s argument, which eventually became the constitutional bedrock of the
Republican Party, was that the Constitution intended the U.S. government “to be kept
free of all connection” with slavery, and to exclude slavery from the territories.92 Slavery
was a local institution, confined to the slave holding states.
Chase drew on several key principles to support his constitutional position:
principles that were to undergird civil rights litigation throughout the 19th century. First,
he drew on the Declaration of Independence and other extra-constitutional sources such
as the Northwest Ordinance to inform his view of the Constitution. To anti-slavery
advocates like Chase, the Declaration’s self-evident truths were not “empty flourishes of
rhetoric,”93 but proof that slavery was not constitutionally “to be fostered or sustained by
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-35national authority.”94 To Chase either the “Declaration of Independence is a fable,” or
the Constitution must recognize all inhabitants of the U.S. as persons with rights.95
Chase also relied on a rule of interpretation that the Constitution must be interpreted
consistently with natural, God-given rights and slavery was a violation of a natural right.
Reaching its highest rhetorical note, Chase’s brief argued that
No legislature can make right wrong; or wrong, right. No legislature can
make light, darkness; or darkness, light. No legislature can make men,
things; or things, men. Nor is any legislature at liberty to disregard the
fundamental principles of rectitude and justice whether restrained or not
by constitutional provisions, these are acts beyond any legitimate or
binding legislative authority . . .96
The Court is obligated therefore to avoid interpreting the U.S. Constitution
in a manner which will bring its provisions into conflict with that other
CONSTITUTION, which, rising, in sublime majesty, over all human
enactments . . . finds its “seat in the bosom of God.”97
Chase’s real plea in Van Zandt, as in many of his other cases, was not to the Court
but to the public and history. For Chase, the final arbiter in cases of a “moral and
political nature” is not the court’s judgment, but “public opinion, not of the American
people only, but of the Civilized World.”98
Anti-slavery lawyers like Chase, and their southern counterparts, understood that
an appeal to the Constitution had the same kind of force on public opinion as the equally
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-36common appeal to the Bible, and therefore tried to read into the Constitution self-evident,
natural rights. As the son of one of Chase’s friends later recounted, the appeal to
fundamental rights, “however little it might convince a court, was the most effective of
all the anti-slavery arguments, because it brought back the discussion to the absolute
incongruity of democracy and slavery, and emphasized both the question of moral right
and the social expediency of upholding the moral law.”99
Nobody was surprised—except possibly Chase—when the Supreme Court
unanimously ruled against Van Zandt, holding the Fugitive Slave Act constitutional
despite “its supposed inexpediency and [the] invalidity of all laws recognizing slavery or
any right of property in man.”100 But despite losing, Chase wrote that he was “thankful”
to have brought the case.101 His arguments were widely publicized and he was
“satisfied” with the public discussion the case generated. Abolitionists praised his
arguments, and the respect he won in Van Zandt and other fugitive slave cases helped
propel Chase to election to the U.S. Senate in 1849 and Governor of Ohio in 1855 and
1857. Lincoln appointed him Secretary of Treasury in 1861, and when Chase could not
99
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-37contain his presidential ambition, and quietly tried to run against Lincoln in 1864,
Lincoln recognized his dedication and legal skills honed in his fugitive slave litigation,
nominated him to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1864.
While Chase went on to a national career, the poor, old abolitionist farmer John
Van Zandt, who had found “special gratification in aiding fugitives from the oppression
of slavery,”102 died in 1845, while his case was pending in the Supreme Court. But Van
Zandt’s struggle lived on in the hearts and minds of others. Chase considered the
underground railroader John Van Troupe in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin
to be modeled on Van Zandt, and hoped that “even though my poor old client be
sacrificed, the great cause of humanity will be a gainer by it.”103
The main long-term legacy of Chase and other fugitive slave litigators was their
contribution to a culture that encourages political movements to use courts as vehicles of
political protest. That litigation aided the rising tide of Northern public opinion against
slavery and eventually contributed to a Republican Party nominee who won the
presidency helped by his attacks on the Supreme Court. As the prominent Wisconsin
newspaper editor Rufus King wrote in 1855, the judicial controversy over the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act “must provoke, everywhere, discussion and
agitation, and Liberty and Right must profit by these.”104
Nor was Chase the only anti-slavery advocate who used the courtroom for
political ends prior to the Civil War. Another group of abolitionists waged a more
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-38utopian battle to constitutionally extinguish slavery everywhere in the United States.
These abolitionists also read the Constitution to conform to the Declaration of
Independence and the natural right to freedom but drew the much more radical
conclusion that the Constitution required the abolition of slavery both in the North and in
the South. They did so in the belief that Northern reverence for the Constitution required
the abolitionist movement to develop an anti-slavery constitutional interpretation in order
to gain adherents and spur anti-slavery sentiment. Like Chase and the more moderate
anti-slavery movement, the utopian constitutionalists used test-case litigation as one
means of publicizing their constitutional doctrines.
In 1844, the utopian constitutionalists created an opportunity to litigate their broad
constitutional theories in court. That year, New Jersey ratified a new constitution that
included a Declaration of Rights providing that “All men are by nature free and
independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights.”105 Although the framers of
the New Jersey constitution had ignored the continued, although dying existence of
slavery in that state, the New Jersey Anti-Slavery Society nevertheless resolved to initiate
a test case to “settle the question of the existence of slavery under the new
Constitution.”106 They genuinely hoped to win in court, but the abolitionists’ primary
goal was to focus the attention of an indifferent public on their cause.107
The New Jersey abolitionists realized that their constitutional challenge to the
remnants of slavery in New Jersey would be difficult, and their leader, John Grimes, was
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-39openly dubious.108 Alvan Stewart who argued the case for the abolitionists, eschewed
legal formalism in favor of a broad political-moral argument. While he purported to be
arguing a dry legal question,109 his argument reads like a political speech or religious
sermon. In his request for relief, he asked that the “court set the nation the shining
example of doing right on this question, by acting up to the full measure of their judicial
and moral power.”110
The New Jersey Supreme Court, by a 3-1 vote, rejected Stewart’s plea. The
justices chose to follow the formalistic reasoning of the defense counsel, Joseph Bradley,
who was later appointed to the United States Supreme Court.111 According to one
member of New Jersey’s highest court, Stewart’s arguments were “rather addressed to
the feelings than to the legal intelligence of the court.”112 Only the antislavery Justice
Joseph Hornblower dissented, and he did so without writing an opinion.113
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The abolitionists appealed to the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court by a 7-1 vote without issuing written
opinions. State v. Post, 21 N.J.L. 699 (N.J. 1848).

-40While losing in Court, the New Jersey Slave Cases did accomplish the
abolitionists’ aim of initiating a political debate on slavery, which ended in the New
Jersey legislature’s formal abolition of slavery in that state several years later.114
Similarly, in Boston black and white abolitionists waged a concerted campaign in
the 1840s to end segregation, which included litigation as one component of the broader
political effort. The litigation lost in court, but helped place the issue of segregation on
the legislative agenda. In 1841, a number of black abolitionists, including Frederick
Douglass, attempted to ride the “white” cars of various segregated Massachusetts
railroads.115 When physically removed, they often sued; yet the lower courts ruled in
favor of the railroads. The abolitionists turned to the legislature, and the resulting
pressure forced the railroads to voluntarily end segregated cars.116 The Boston
abolitionist community then challenged school segregation. In the 1849 case Roberts v.
Boston, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion written by the
prominent antislavery judge Lemuel Shaw, upheld segregated schools in
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-41Massachusetts.117 Yet, despite their loss in the courts, the abolitionist community
continued its political struggle, and, five years later, the Massachusetts legislature barred
segregation. Similarly, New York City blacks in the 1850s formed the Legal Rights
Association and, represented by future President Chester A. Arthur and other lawyers,
staged a series of sit-ins against segregated streetcars, losing in court but succeeding in
pressuring a number of railroads to end segregation.118 In each of these cases the
litigation was brought, not merely to prevail in court, but as one method to spur debate in
both the public at large and in the legislature.
After the Civil War, African Americans continued this abolitionist tradition,
waging an impressive campaign in the courts against racial discrimination in schools.
Between 1865 and 1903, more than seventy challenges to discriminatory schools were
litigated throughout the United States.119 Blacks overwhelmingly lost the cases that were
decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, although they were often successful on
narrower state law claims.120 Moreover, even lawsuits that lost in court often led to
legislative victories. For example, New York blacks lost all six cases that they brought
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-42challenging school segregation in the 19th century, but the judicial battle was a
springboard to victory in the local political arena; the state legislature enacted legislation
securing integration. As Professor J. Morgan Kousser has written about the New York
experience: “the failures of success and the ultimate success that stemmed from those
failures . . . all would be missed by observers concerned only with the abstract principles
embodied in printed court opinions.”121
The early women’s movement also used the courts for the purposes of political
agitation. At an 1869 women’s suffrage convention, a husband and wife team of
Missouri suffragists, Francis and Virginia Minor, argued that, instead of agitating for a
new constitutional provision granting women, feminists should assert that they already
had the constitutional right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and
immunities clause. They urged women to attempt to vote and, if prevented, to sue the
officials who had denied them that right. The Minors viewed litigation as a means not
only of vindicating rights, but also of educating the public. Francis Minor urged that a
test case be brought because, “in no other way could our cause be more widely, and at the
same time definitely, brought before the public. Every newspaper in the land would tell
the story, every fireside would hear the news. The question would be thoroughly
discussed by thousands who now give it no thought.”122
Several test cases were brought by what became known as the New Departure
Movement. The case that stirred the most political debate and controversy was initiated
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-43when Susan B. Anthony convinced the Republican poll inspectors to allow her to vote in
the 1872 election.
Anthony and her comrades created an immediate sensation around the country,
earning both cheers and attacks. The New York Times boldly declared that “the act of
Susan B. Anthony should have a place in history”; the Toledo Blade praised her for
“keeping the public mind agitated upon the women’s rights question,” while the
hometown Rochester Union and Advertiser condemned her for “female lawlessness.”123
But Susan Anthony saw voting as a mere precursor to the main event.
Encouraged by the response to her dramatic action, she hoped to launch a test case on
behalf of the registered women who had been turned away from the polls. For Anthony,
as for the abolitionists Chase and Stewart, litigation was both a means to win concrete
rights and an opportunity to convert the courtroom into an arena for protest. A courtroom
battle, she believed, would provide a dramatic forum for publicizing the cause. To her
friend, the feminist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton, she wrote about the exhilaration of
casting a vote in a national election, and her expectation of the ensuing litigation: “[W]e
are in for a fine agitation in Rochester on this question.”124
Anthony could not have foreseen the course of events that was to result in one of
the great state trials of the 19th century. On Thanksgiving Day, a federal marshal asked
the women voters of Rochester to turn themselves in to be prosecuted under an 1870
federal statute, grandly titled “An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United
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-44States to Vote.” Designed to prevent former Confederates from voting illegally and to
prevent Klan intimidation of black voters, the statute had ensnared as its first victims a
respectable group of northern housewives who had voted for the Republican ticket.
The women did not surrender. As Anthony reported, “The ladies refusing to
respond to this polite invitation, Marshal Keeney made the circuit to collect the rebellious
forces.”125 Finely tuned to political theater, Anthony even demanded that the courteous
and embarrassed marshal take her to jail in handcuffs. Eventually, all the women voters
and the three election inspectors who had let them vote were indicted. The stage was
thus set for a courtroom battle that would be even more dramatic than the test case
Anthony had originally hoped to bring.126
After her indictment in December 1872, Anthony launched a broad speaking
campaign to educate the people of Rochester on the right of all citizens to have equal
access to the ballot. Over the course of the next several months, Anthony spoke in
twenty-nine different post-office districts in the county, hoping, she said, “to make a
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Of course, resort to test-case litigation had its critics, even among supporters of
women’s suffrage. The famous abolitionist orator Wendell Phillips agreed with the New
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and immunities required women suffrage but believed that the legal argument was “too
good a handle for agitation to be risked by a speedy contest in the courts.” As Phillips
prophetically argued, “an adverse decision would destroy its value as a new means of
attack.” Woman Suffrage Before the Courts, THE REVOLUTION, June 11, 1871. The
Nation opined that the change the New Departurists hoped for was too momentous to
occur through judicial resolution; women’s suffrage, the paper editorialized, “could not
be achieved by anything short of deliberate popular consent.” The Nation, June 26, 1987,
at 426. The American Women’s Suffrage Association viewed the litigation effort as
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-45verdict of guilty impossible.”127 Her campaign obviously was having an impact, for the
district attorney moved to change the trial’s venue to another county, and the court
granted his motion.
The change of venue did not stop Anthony’s agitation. In the twenty-two days
before the opening of the trial, Anthony made twenty-one speeches in the new county to
which the action had been transferred. Another suffrage leader, Matilda Joslyn Gage,
spoke in an additional sixteen townships. Together they covered the entire county, taking
the offensive and declaring that “the United States [is] on trial, not Susan B. Anthony.”128
Anthony publicized her argument that she had committed no crime but simply exercised
her citizen’s right to vote, as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Anthony clearly was successful in generating nationwide publicity. Her use of
the pending court proceeding as a forum on women’s suffrage set off a lively debate in
the press. The Syracuse Standard wrote that “Miss S. B. Anthony . . . is conducting her
case in a way that beats even lawyers,” while the New York Commercial Advertiser
admired the “regular St. Anthony’s dance she leads the District Attorney . . . in spite of
winter cold or summer heat, [Anthony] will carry her case from county to county
precisely as fast as the venue is changed. One must rise very early in the morning to get
the start of this active apostle of the sisterhood.”129 Other papers excoriated Anthony’s
attempt to influence public opinion. A Rochester Union & Advertiser piece was
headlined, “Susan B. Anthony as a Corruptionist,” and angrily declared that “United
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-46States Courts are not stages for the enactment of comedy or farce.”130 A reader wrote in
that Anthony was committing “a law offense known as embracery,” defined as “such
practices as lead to affect the administration of justice, improperly working upon the
minds of jurors.”131
Anthony’s trial opened on June 18, 1873, before the newly appointed Supreme
Court Justice Ward Hunt.132 The packed courtroom included such notables as former
President Millard Fillmore, Senator Charles Sedgwick, and former Congressman E. G.
Lapham.
Justice Hunt immediately made it clear that he was determined to limit Anthony’s
use of the case for political protest. He refused to permit Anthony to be a witness in her
own behalf, ruling that she was incompetent, although he did allow the Assistant U.S.
District Attorney to submit hearsay evidence of Anthony’s testimony at pretrial hearings.
Anthony’s lead attorney was retired New York State Appellate Judge and former
New York lieutenant governor, Henry Selden. After Selden’s three-hour argument and
the district attorney’s rebuttal, Judge Hunt read his prepared opinion. Written before the
trial had commenced, it stated that Anthony had no right to vote under the Constitution
and that any mistaken belief she may have had about such a right did not excuse her
criminal action. As a matter of law, he directed the jury to find Anthony guilty and then
discharged the jury.
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-47The court then fined Anthony $100 and the costs of the prosecution, to which
Anthony replied that she would not pay a penny and would exhort women that
“resistance to tyranny is obedience to God.”133 But Anthony was not sent to prison for
refusing to pay her fine. In an unusual move for such a case, Hunt said that he would not
order Anthony imprisoned until the fine was paid. As Anthony’s lawyer John Van
Voorhis later commented, it was an adroit move, intended to deny Anthony the ability to
use a writ of habeas corpus to take her case directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States, where she would have had an excellent argument that her right to trial by jury had
been denied.134 Anthony never paid the fine, the government never proceeded to enforce
the fine or to jail her, the other women voters’ cases were not prosecuted, and Anthony
lost her chance for Supreme Court review.
Anthony’s case did generate substantial public controversy. Virtually every
newspaper in the country reported and commented on the trial, and several reprinted
Anthony’s arguments about women’s right to vote.135
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Hunt for violating one of the most important provisions of the Constitution, while the
Utica Observer approved Hunts’ interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment but
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-48More than a thousand dollars and scores of letters of support poured in to
Anthony after Hunt’s verdict. She used most of the money to publish a pamphlet
containing a full report on the trial. Three thousand copies were sent out to libraries and
newspapers all over the country, and five thousand copies of Selden’s argument were also
distributed.136 The next year, one newspaper called Anthony “America’s best known
woman.”137 She had used litigation successfully to protest women’s inequality, speaking
to thousands of people about the case, engaging prominent figures in her agitation up to
and including the President of the United States, and initiating debate in legal journals, as
well as in the popular press of the day.
The New Departurists brought a number of other test cases, all of which lost in
court. The decisive loss came when the Supreme Court unanimously ruled, in a case
brought by the Minors that the Constitution did not guarantee women the right to vote.138
Despite their losses, the New Departurists as one historian has noted, were not primarily
“outcome-oriented” litigants, but activists who believed that the real success of their
strategy “must be measured in terms of the amount and kind of publicity it was able to
generate.”139
Susan B. Anthony’s case is now remembered as a noble, legitimate and useful
attempt to enlist the courts and country in behalf of women’s right to vote. Supreme
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-49Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, reflecting on the significance of Anthony’s case
stated:
In another respect, Susan B. Anthony was the clear victor. Her treatment
at the hands of the judicial system won for her the sympathy even of those
who had been opposed to her original act.”140
Anthony was denied a jury trial precisely because she had successfully used her case as a
forum for public agitation and protest.
Nor was Anthony the only early leader of the women’s movement to use the
courts in this fashion. Margaret Sanger, the birth control activist, who in 1914 founded a
magazine Women Rebel, “dedicated to the interest of working women,”141 provoked an
indictment with the notion of using the resulting trial to garner publicity for her cause.
Similarly civil liberties organizations in the first part of the twentieth century,
well before the well publicized law reform movements of the 1950s and 60s, used
litigation as a means for publicizing their cause. The Free Speech League clearly saw the
early 1900s free speech fights and the resulting court cases as a means of publicizing its
radical first amendment views.142 Even the more conservative ACLU, despite
Frankfurter’s early objections, used litigation in tandem with other means of publicizing
its views. In the 1930s watershed case of Hague v. CIO, establishing the right to use
public forums to publicize one’s views, one chronicler of the ACLU notes that
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-50The ACLU did not simply run to the courthouse; it sent speakers like
Norman Thomas to Jersey City to protest the Hague regime’s
discrimination against labor organizers. It consciously sought out
publicity in the media, including more conservative establishment
newspapers. It persuaded influentials like Walter Lippman and Dorothy
Thompson to speak out. And it solicited the assistance of organizations
like the CIO. While litigation was critical, it was nevertheless only a
single element in a well-orchestrated campaign of resistance.143
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-51To summarize, these examples illustrate that throughout American history,
political movements and organizations have resorted to the courts, and the federal courts
in particular, not simply to win favorable court decisions, but as a mechanism to publicize
these movements’ views. Even when this litigation lost in court, as in Chase’s or
Anthony’s cases, the cases often generated substantial publicity and sympathy for the
litigants. Lawyers such as Chase were viewed by respected legal observers such as
Justice Story and Charles Sumner as being engaged in legitimate litigation and using
appropriate strategies, and his legal work on behalf of fugitive slaves was one
qualification that supported his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
III.

First Amendment Protection for Using Courts as Forums for Protest
The use by protest movements of the courts as forums to express and publicize

their views finds protection under the First Amendment. On many occasions, the
Supreme Court has proclaimed that litigation is a “form of political expression” protected
by the First Amendment.144 In 1972, the Court held that “the right of access to the courts
is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”145 The Court has reiterated that “[f]iling
a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity,” protected by the First
Amendment.146
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-52The Supreme Court has also specifically noted the difference between private
litigation to resolve disputes and public interest lawsuits which are at the core of the First
Amendment’s protective ambit and are thus entitled to greater protection. In NAACP v.
Button, for example, the Court noted that “[i]n the context of NAACP objectives,
litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving
the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local,
for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political
expression . . . resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different
matter from the oppressive, malicious or avaricious use of the legal process for purely
private gain.”147 The Button Court felt that “regulations which reflect hostility to stirring
up litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for private
gain, serving no public interest.”148
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in In re Primus also relied on the distinction
between public interest litigation and litigation undertaken primarily for pecuniary gain to
determine the constitutionally permissible scope of a state’s proscription of
solicitation.149 The Court noted that Primus’
actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to
advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive
financial gain. The question presented in this case is whether in light of
the values protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these
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-53differences materially affect the scope of state regulation of the conduct of
lawyers.150
Justice Powell held that those differences were material.151 He noted that for the ACLU,
like the NAACP, litigation is a form of political expression and political association.
Most importantly, Justice Powell argued that “The ACLU engages in litigation as a
vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of
communicating useful information to the public.”152 In Primus, as in Button the Court
recognized that litigation can be a form of “cooperative, organizational activity,” which is
part of the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas”
protected by the First Amendment.153
The Court has also relied on the First Amendment to severely limit the
applicability of federal statutes to sanction litigation that was undertaken in “bad faith.”
In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Inc., the Court invoked the
150

Id. at 422.

151

The court on other occasions has noted that the difference between public
interest litigation and litigation for pecuniary gain is significant in determining the
constitutionality of bar rules. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). The
American Bar Association has also recognized that the rules for professional conduct
cannot ignore the differences between public interest and purely private litigation. In
deciding that a National Lawyers Committee opposed to New Deal legislation could,
consistent with the rules of professional ethics, offer counsel without fee or charge to
anyone financially unable to retain counsel to challenge such legislation, the ABA’s
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances held that “the question presented, with
its implication, involves problems of political, social and economic character that have
long since assumed the proportions of national issues, one side or the other which
multitude of patriotic citizens have aligned themselves. These issues transcend the range
of professional ethics.” Opinion 148, Opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, American Bar Association 308, 312 (1957).
152

Id. at 431 (emphasis added).

153

436 U.S. at 438 n.32.

-54First Amendment right of petition to interpret the Sherman Act as immunizing a litigant
from antitrust liability even where the litigant was motivated solely by an anticompetitive intent and not by an expectation of a successful outcome to the litigation.
Such litigation was entitled to immunity unless it was also “objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”154
Moreover, even if subjectively “bad faith,” anti-competitive litigation presented a “novel”
claim without any supporting authority, it was nonetheless entitled to antitrust immunity,
“as long as a similarly situated reasonable litigant could have perceived some likelihood
of success.”155
Similarly, in Bill Johnson Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB the Court held that First
Amendment and federalism concerns prevented “a well-founded lawsuit” from being
“enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for
the plaintiff’s desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by
the [NLRA].”156 “The right of access to a court is too important to be called an unfair
labor practice solely on the ground that what is sought in court is to enjoin employees
from exercising a protected right.”157 The Court recognized in Johnson, as in Primus,
that it is legitimate to petition the judiciary not merely for compensation and the
psychological benefits of vindication but also for the “public airing of disputed facts.”158
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-55The Court relied on its antitrust jurisprudence to determine that the Board could only
enjoin suits brought with a retaliatory motive that were also baseless.159
In its most recent holding, B&K Construction Company v. NLRB, the Court
further articulated the protection the First Amendment accords litigation.160 There the
question was whether the NLRB may impose liability on an employer for a retaliatory
lawsuit that turned out to be unsuccessful. The Court first suggested that baseless or
frivolous lawsuits might not be completely unprotected by the First Amendment.
Analogizing baseless litigation to false statements, the majority noted that “the First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters.”161 Baseless litigation may be protected to ensure that the freedom of speech
and press receive “breathing space, essential to their fruitful exercise”—a protection
analogous to that articulated in New York Times v. Sullivan that a public official seeking
damages for defamation prove that false statements were made with knowledge or
reckless disregard of their falsity.162 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion stated that
these “breathing space” principles were consistent with the Court’s prior cases limiting
regulation of litigation to “suits that were both objectively and subjectively motivated by
an unlawful purpose.”163 Ultimately, the Court did not decide the scope of First

159

Id. at 744 (citing California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972)).
160

536 U.S. 516 (2002).

161

Id. at 531 emphasis in original quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 341 (1974).
162

Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433).

163

Id.

-56Amendment protection to be accorded frivolous litigation, since the case involved the
class of “reasonably based but unsuccessful litigation” which had a retaliatory, anti-union
motive.164
Justice O’Connor stated that the First Amendment protects all genuine petitions
and not merely those that are successful. The “genuineness of a grievance does not
depend on whether it succeeds.”165 Equally important, the Court articulated the First
Amendment interests advanced by an unsuccessful but reasonably based suit.
Unsuccessful suits allow the “public airing of disputed facts . . . and raise matters of
public concern. They also promote the evolution of the law by supporting the
development of legal theories that may not gain acceptance the first time around.”166
Those values—public airing of disputes, raising issues of public concern,
promoting a community’s own narrative of the law, which may not be accepted by the
state immediately but which is eventually adopted later on—are values traditionally
associated with litigation. The Court in B&K thus recognizes that litigation has
legitimate and important purposes apart from winning in Court.
Despite its broad invocation of First Amendment values and principles, the
Court’s actual holding was quite narrow. The Court avoided deciding the difficult
constitutional issue of the extent to which the First Amendment protects reasonable, but
unsuccessful litigation brought with a retaliatory purpose, by adopting a limiting
construction of the relevant NLRA provision. Nor did the court decide whether the
164
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-57NLRB could sanction an unsuccessful but reasonably based lawsuit which was filed
solely to impose the costs of the litigation process. Finally, the Court specifically
included the caveat that “nothing in our holding today should be read to question the
validity of common litigation sanctions imposed by courts themselves—such as those
authorized under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .”167
Taken individually, each of these cases invoking the First Amendment to
determine the permissible scope of state or congressional regulation of litigation may
stand for relatively narrow propositions. But as a whole, these cases have profound
implications for the role of litigation that seeks not only or even primarily to obtain a
favorable reply from the government official petitioned—whether it be an Executive
official or judge—but to provoke public debate and discourse on the subject of the
petition. Notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s caveat concerning Rule 11 and other
litigation sanctions imposed by courts, the B&K opinion does appear to call into
constitutional question the use of sanctions against lawyers such as Ramsey Clark or Bill
Kunstler for bringing litigation to educate the public about important issues.
B.

Sanctions and the First Amendment

The use of courts as forums to spark political protest and debate throughout
American history, and the Supreme Court’s more recent explicit recognition of the first
amendment values and protections of litigation support the legitimacy of litigation
brought to achieve these purposes. Courts must analyze Rule 11 and other similar state
court sanctions in light of the First Amendment protection accorded litigation. Yet many
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-58court decisions, including a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, pay no heed to
First Amendment principles when imposing sanctions on attorneys.168
The authority of judges to sanction attorneys who present frivolous claims, or
bring non-frivolous claims for what a court terms an improper motive, or seek publicity
for their clients or causes is the power to determine that certain legal arguments or
strategies are illegitimate and to use the state’s power to stifle and curtail their
articulation and development. During the past two decades, public interest attorneys such
as prominent Civil Rights advocates Ramsey Clark and Bill Kunstler have been
sanctioned for what courts termed frivolous claims or improper motives. In other cases,
defendants have sought sanctions in an effort to chill litigation, as occurred in the
litigation challenging the United States policies towards Haitians fleeing persecution in
that country. In that case, the government responded to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit by moving
to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs’ lawyers for bringing a frivolous
lawsuit.169 That motion was obviously an attempt to chill the lawyers and gave them
“considerable concern,” although it became moot when the district court granted the
plaintiffs the relief they sought.170 Many lawyers were so chilled: a 1980s American
Judicature Society study found that almost one-third of lawyers representing civil rights
plaintiffs reported that they had declined to present a claim they believed to be
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170

Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33
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-59meritorious.”171 While the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 have significantly ameliorated
the problem, the text of Rule 11 and its interpretation by some courts still may create a
chilling effect on public interest litigation.
Rule 11(b)(1) provides that a litigant or lawyer can be sanctioned where a case or
motion is brought “for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”172 Rule 11(b)(2) requires the attorney
to certify that the claim or defense or other legal contention are not baseless in that it is
“warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.”173 The
requirement that a lawsuit or motion not be presented for an improper purpose raises two
First Amendment questions. The first is what is an improper purpose; more specifically
is a lawsuit that has as either a purpose or primary purpose obtaining publicity for a
plaintiff’s cause improper. Second, can a lawsuit that is nonfrivolous nonetheless be
sanctioned because it was brought in whole or in part for political purposes. The
questions are important because, as the social science research explored at the beginning
of this article demonstrates, many public interest cases, whether successful or
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-60unsuccessful, are brought with an aim of seeking favorable publicity for a plaintiff’s
cause. Yet Rule 11 can be read to render such litigation illegitimate and sanctionable.
1.

Publicity as an Improper Purpose

The courts have divided on whether a litigant who files an action or a motion
seeking publicity has an improper purpose under Rule 11(b)(1). The Second and the
Ninth Circuits have held that seeking publicity is not an improper purpose—at least for
claims that are nonfrivolous. The Second Circuit recently overturned a District Court’s
imposition of sanctions against litigants who had brought an action with the purpose of
obtaining publicity to put pressure on defendants:
The district court held that the filing of the complaint with a view to
exerting pressure on defendants through the generation of adverse and
economically disadvantageous publicity reflected an improper purpose.
To the extent that a complaint is not held to lack foundation in law or fact,
we disagree. It is not the role of Rule 11 to safeguard a defendant from
public criticism that may result from the assertion of nonfrivolous claims.
Further, unless such measures are needed to protect the integrity of the
judicial system or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial, a court’s steps
to deter attorneys from, or to punish them for, speaking to the press have
serious First Amendment implications.174
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected sanctions against plaintiffs whose motives were
arguably to delay and defeat a recall attempt against a city councilman rather than merely
obtaining the specific voting rights sought in the complaint. The court held that such a
174

Sussman v. Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995).

-61political purpose would not be improper under the Rule. “[T]he political inspiration for
the federal lawsuit does not necessarily mean that the action is ‘improper’ within the
meaning of Rule 11. Much of the redistricting litigation under the Equal Protection
Clause has been inspired by those with a transparent political interest.”175
Other courts, however, disagree. The Fifth Circuit has recently held that an
attorney can be sanctioned because he had an improper purpose of embarrassing his
adversary by obtaining adverse publicity.176 That the attorney “orchestrated” a media
event was strong evidence of his improper purpose which was sanctionable even if the
action the attorney took was not frivolous. Some District Courts have also concluded that
plaintiffs seeking publicity by filing a reasonable complaint constitutes an improper
purpose.177 The Fourth Circuit suggested in Kunstler that holding a press conference and
seeking publicity was an improper purpose if that were the plaintiff’s central or primary
purpose in filing the complaint.178
These cases illustrate the confusion surrounding the definition of an improper
purpose. Litigation brought that has the purpose of sparking public debate or promoting
greater public awareness of an issue, or obtaining publicity to put pressure on a
defendant, should not be viewed as improper. Nor can the filing of complaints or
175
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In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990). Kunstler and some other cases
suggesting that seeking publicity constitutes an improper purpose (but not the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Whitehead) occurred in the context of cases the court also found to
be frivolous. Therefore those cases are not necessarily inconsistent with the Second and
Ninth Circuit’s finding that seeking publicity or some other political goal does not
constitute an improper purpose in the context of nonfrivolous litigation.

-62motions through press conferences be viewed as either in “poor taste” or evidence of
improper purpose; public interest lawyers who file pro bono litigation frequently
announce their suits in press conferences for the purpose of drawing broad public
attention to their grievances.179 This type of litigation falls within the core First
Amendment protection articulated by the court in Button, Primus and B&K, and cannot
be sanctioned simply because the petition is directed at the public and not simply the
court.
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-632.

Sanctioning Nonfrivolous Lawsuits That Have an Improper
Purpose

The text and the history of Rule 11 also suggests that a finding of any improper
motive alone is sufficient for the court to award sanctions. The Circuit Courts are split on
this issue. A number of Circuits have departed from the text of Rule 11(b)(1) and will
not sanction a plaintiff for filing a nonfrivolous complaint, even if the plaintiff’s purpose
is improper.180 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has repeatedly ruled that
sanctions are appropriate where a party has filed a nonfrivolous complaint for an
improper purpose,181 and the Fifth Circuit recently has concurred in that approach.182
Other circuits, in dictum, have suggested that improper purpose alone can support Rule
11 sanctions even where a complaint is nonfrivolous.183 A number of District Courts
have sanctioned plaintiffs based solely on a finding of improper purpose independent of
an analysis of whether the complaint was nonfrivolous.184
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For example, Justice Breyer, when he sat on the First Circuit joined an opinion
stating that Rule 11 has been read “to reach groundless but ‘sincere’ pleadings, as well as
those which, while not devoid of all merit, were filed for some malign purpose.”
Lanelloli v. Foy, 909 F.2d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1990). The Third and Eleventh Circuits
have also suggested that sanctions are appropriate for a complaint filed with improper

-64It seems inconsistent that the First Amendment right of access to Article III courts
requires that the federal antitrust statute be read to allow regulation only of suits that are
both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by an unlawful purpose, yet Rule 11
can sanction lawsuits that are either objectively baseless or undertaken with an improper
purpose. Justice O’Connor suggests that sanctions imposed on litigants by the courts
themselves, are different than sanctions created by federal law. Yet it is unclear why the
First Amendment should afford less protection against judicially imposed sanctions,185
since both anti-trust and Rule 11 sanctions may only be imposed by a court after it
concludes that a lawsuit is “improper.” Certainly the legislature’s interest in preventing
anti-competitive or anti-union lawsuits is as important, if not stronger, than the
judiciary’s interest in preventing frivolous or otherwise improper litigation. While the
anti-trust treble-damages remedy may pose a serious chilling effect, so too obviously
does the potential of Rule 11 sanctions.
3.

Frivolous Claims

The Rule 11 requirement that a litigant certify that his or her claims are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal
purpose alone. CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 578
(3d Cir. 1991); Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993) (Rule 11 requires
sanctions for filing of a frivolous pleading or a pleading in bad faith for an improper
purpose). See generally Andrews, supra note 19, at nn.122-25.
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Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117, 122 (E.D.N.C. 1991) even
though the plaintiff had made a reasonable inquiry and had a legitimate purpose of
seeking relief, solely because his improper purpose of harassing defendant outweighed
the proper one. In Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corp., 130 F.R.D. 665 (W.D. Mo. 1990)
the court found that plaintiff had not made a proper factual inquiry, but even had a
reasonable basis existed for the filing of the complaint, because it was filed solely for
publicity and harassment, sanctions were appropriate.
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Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

-65of existing law or the establishment of new law is equally problematic. Ironically, the
replacement of the old subjective, bad faith test with an objective reasonableness test has
made the amended Rule 11 much more unpredictable.186 Empirical research conducted
by the Federal Judicial Center found that presented with a number of hypothetical cases,
judges most often divided almost equally as to whether a case was legally frivolous.187
Experience in actual litigation is consistent with the Center’s research. District court and
appellate judges have been unable to agree on whether a case is frivolous. Circuit courts
have held that claims that district courts judges sanctioned as frivolous were not merely
reasonable but winning,188 and that claims District Courts upheld were legally
frivolous.189 The Supreme Court Justices and circuit court panels have found a claim to
be so frivolous that no reasonable litigant could believe it meritorious even though strong
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-66opinions by their presumably reasonable brethren find that the litigant had stated a valid
claim.190
Most commentators concur that despite the Rule 11’s attempt to create an
“objective” standard of frivolous litigation, courts have been unable to develop a
principled line for determining whether a complaint is so baseless as to be frivolous.191
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the definition of frivolous is fundamentally
indeterminate,192 or as Professor Sandford Levinson has put it:
It is, I suspect, no coincidence that writers on frivolousness have tended to
adopt versions of Justice Stewart’s famous (or is the correct word
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For example in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) the Court reversed a
dismissal of a prisoner’s petition and the lower court’s award of attorney’s fees against
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-67“notorious”?) test of pornography, that is “[P]erhaps I could never succeed
in intelligently [defining it] . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it.”193
Indeterminate or vague legal standards chill speech, and that has been the effect
on public interest lawyers asserting novel or cutting edge claims. The vagueness or
indeterminancy of the test for frivolous is evident in cases where a court imposes
sanctions upon a finding that “the case offered no hope whatsoever of success.”194 But
the “no chance of success” standard inherently mixes law and politics indeterminately,
forcing attorneys to decide whether an argument is legally reasonable based on whether
anybody believes in the contemporary political environment any court would adopt it.
This suggests that the frequent litigation brought by Black litigants in the early 1900s
attacking Plessy195 would have been sanctionable since surely any “reasonable” observer
would agree that there was no chance of success whatsoever.
Northwestern Law School Professor Anthony D’Amato has argued that the
Libyan plaintiffs in Saltany had a legitimate legal argument that the United States and
Great Britain bombing of Libya constituted a war crime that should not be accorded
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-68immunity under the Nuremberg precedent established by the United States after World
War II.196 The reason that a reasonable observor could determine that the Saltany
litigation was hopeless was not because of the unreasonableness or frivolousness of the
plaintiffs’ legal argument. Rather, it was the political and legal reality that United States
courts have refused to apply the Nuremberg precedent and more generally international
law norms against United States officials in U.S. courts. Nor should Salmon Chase have
been sanctioned for appealing the Van Zandt case to the Supreme Court, nor the Women
Suffrage Movement for continuing the Minor litigation in the Supreme Court, despite the
certainty in both cases that they would lose. Both cases were presenting arguable legal
theories that resonated with a substantial sector of the American public, if not with the
contemporary court to which they argued.
The 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 sought to blunt the criticism that the threat of
sanctions had discouraged novel litigation.197 The Advisory Committee made clear the
broad latitude to be given novel legal claims, stating that courts should “consider whether
the litigant has support for its theories even in minority opinions in, law reviews, or
through consultation with other lawyers.”198 Similarly, some courts have discarded the
approach that looks at the objective frivolousness of plaintiffs’ claims in favor of an
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-69approach that analyzes whether the attorney’s research and preparation of the litigation or
motion was objectively reasonably.199
Read properly, the Rule immunizes litigators who bring reasonably researched
and thought out claims arguing claims on an issue of public importance. That is because
a colorable argument can be constructed for virtually any proposition: Chase’s argument
that the Fugitive Slave Law was unconstitutional,200 Professor Joseph Singer’s argument
that socialism is implied in the Constitution,201 Professor Gary Lawson’s argument that
“the modern administrative state openly flouts almost every important structural precept
of the American constitutional order,”202 or my own argument that the political branches
of government are constitutionally bound by the fundamental precepts of international
law.203 If these propositions are not frivolous, and the Advisory Committee’s notes
suggest that they should not be so considered, what claims are frivolous? As one
commentator has noted “it is extremely difficult in practice, if not impossible in principle,
to devise an ‘extension, modification or reversal’ exception that does not devour the
‘unwarranted by existing law’ rule.”204
199
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F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 401-02 (1990) (suggesting that key inquiry is reasonableness of investigation).
200

See pp. ___-___ supra.

201

Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1, 22-23 (1984).
202

Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1233 (1994).
203

Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985).
204

Attinson, supra note 191, at 288.

-70Remarkably, many court decisions have not even recognized the applicability of
the First Amendment in the Rule 11 context. For example the Court of Appeals’ decision
in Saltany never mentioned the First Amendment when it held that sanctions were
required because federal courts do not properly “serve as a forum for protests.”205
The indeterminacy of a determination whether a claim is objectively frivolous
requires a recognition that the First Amendment protects lawyers who make losing
arguments about real harms and important values in order to promote public dialogue.
The First Amendment requires some protection or “breathing space” for frivolous
lawsuits, particularly those that reflect core First Amendment values of presenting
important issues of public concern, just as the Amendment precludes public officials
from recovering damages for defamation unless they can prove actual malice.206 For a
court to sanction a legal argument as “objectively frivolous” is to determine that it is
beyond the pale, beyond discussion in the courtroom.207 That the law, like truth, is not
static, requires that the remedy for a legal petition deemed “frivolous” is to respond to it,
not sanction it.
As a New York Bar Association Committee eloquently stated:
Access to the court system is a basic tenet of the American legal and
historical tradition. A sanctions provision which exerts a chilling
influence on creative counsel does violence to this tradition. The sanction
of dismissal or the denial of relief by the court is a sufficient safeguard.
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-71Indeed, in our common law tradition, it is bad public policy to provide
judges with a tool that would permit them not only to dismiss an action,
but also to sanction the losers when in their view the claims or theories
were frivolous.208
C.

The Appropriate Role of Lawyers in the Court of Public Opinion:
Sanctions for Attorney’s Speech

A model that views litigation as a forum for educating the public also raises
questions as to the appropriate role of lawyers as advocates outside the courtroom. That a
lawyer should not argue his or her case outside the courtroom has long been articulated as
a basic obligation of the legal profession.209 That view ignores the long tradition in
American law recounted above of prominent lawyers arguing important law reform cases
not merely in the courts of law, but in the court of public opinion.
The explosion in the media’s attention to the law, particularly in such high profile,
high publicity trials as the murder trial of Sam Sheppard in the 1960s and the O.J.
Simpson trial in the 1990s, has sparked a vigorous debate over the circumstances in
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Report, FORDHAM URBAN L.J., supra note 193, at 8-9. The committee
recommended a standard that would impose sanctions only for abusive conduct, not
frivolous claims position that ought to be the rule: that conduct sanctionable ought to be
abusive rather than frivolous, which it defined abusive conduct as conduct “undertaken or
omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably the resolution of the litigation or to
harass or maliciously injure another.” Id. at 12. That recommendation has not been
adopted by the New York courts.
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See Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (1995) [hereinafter Legal Spin Control]. See, for
example, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 20 (1908), in American Bar Association,
Selected Statutes, Rules and Standards on the Legal Profession 237 (1990) (“Newspaper
publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair
trial in the courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally
they are to be condemned.”).

-72which a lawyer may engage in extrajudicial advocacy. Some courts, commentators and
leaders of the bar have urged that a lawyer’s proper function is to “present his (or her)
case in the courtroom, not . . . to build a favorable climate of public opinion,” and would
permit rules narrowly limiting the circumstances in which a lawyer may present her
client’s case to the public.210 Other judges and commentators have concluded that an
attorney’s advocacy for his client outside the courtroom is both legitimate and strongly
protected by the First Amendment. They would strictly limit the restrictions the bar and
judiciary may place on such speech as those necessary to protect against a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice.211
Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983 and
then amended in 1994, attempts to weave a compromise between the competing views,
yet is significantly more protective of lawyers’ speech than the rules contained in the
older Model Code of Professional Responsibility.212 While the Model Code sees little
public value in attorneys’ extrajudicial speech, the commentary to the Model Rule
recognizes that “there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of
210
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newer Model Rules provide that the lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement if it
“will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”

-73information about events having legal consequences and about the legal proceedings
themselves.”213
Both lawyers’ use of the media and restrictions on lawyers’ speech have become
increasingly common in the last few decades.214 The battle has become particularly
intense over restrictions on criminal defense attorneys’ speech in the context of an
ongoing or pending criminal trial. In Gentile v. State Bar, the Supreme Court narrowly
divided 5-4 on the First Amendment standard to be applied to attorney speech. Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist upheld a Nevada Rule that was based on Model Rule
3.6 which prohibited a lawyer from making “an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”215 The Court held that the First Amendment did
not require the state to meet a “clear and present danger” standard before disciplining an
attorney for public pronouncements about a pending criminal trial, but permitted such
discipline upon a lesser showing of “substantial likelihood of material prejudice.”216 The
court balanced the general First Amendment interests in information about criminal trials
against “the basic premise of our legal system . . . that lawsuits should be tried in court,
not in the media.”217 Writing for four Justices, Justice Kennedy would have applied the
213
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-74First Amendment clear and present danger test to state prohibitions on attorney speech,
and not the more deferential balancing test of the majority. Kennedy rejected the state’s
argument that attorney contact with the press during the pendency of a trial somehow “is
inimical to the attorney’s proper role,” and pointed out that the State’s disciplinary rules
did not posit any inconsistency between an attorney’s role and discussions with the
press.218 Moreover, Kennedy recognized the legitimacy, value and even necessity in
some circumstances of attorneys’ commentary to the press. For attorneys hold “unique
qualifications as a source of information about pending cases,” and that in some
circumstances, an attorney’s “press comment is necessary to protect the rights of the
client and prevent abuse of the courts.”219
Despite the majority view that lawyer’s speech about pending cases can be
regulated under a less demanding First Amendment standard, the court nonetheless
reversed the State’s discipline of the lawyer for his comments to the press. A majority of
the Court, including Justice O’Connor, who had joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion on the
First Amendment standard to be used, found the Disciplinary Rule, as interpreted by the
Nevada Supreme Court, void for vagueness. Attorney Gentile had carefully researched
the rule and had attempted to comply with its safe harbor immunity for a lawyer to “state
without elaboration the general nature of the . . . defense.”220 In its vagueness
determination, the court held that the First Amendment required the state to regulate
lawyer’s speech clearly enough to avoid the suppression of speech critical of those who
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-75enforce the law, a requirement particularly relevant to the regulation of “the criminal
defense bar, which has the professional mission to challenge actions of the state.” In a
sense, the Court’s vagueness holding in Gentile is similar to court opinions in the Rule 11
arena that would not sanction well researched complaints because they meet the stand of
objective reasonableness, even if a court might find that the claims they presented had no
chance of success.221
The Supreme Court’s Gentile decision thus reflects the deep division within the
Bar about the legitimacy of and protection to be accorded attorney speech. While Gentile
and most other attorney speech cases occur in the context of a criminal case, Model Rule
3.6 at issue in Gentile is applicable to civil cases also,222 and there have been attempts to
sanction or gag attorneys or litigants in conjunction with public interest civil litigation
such as environmental litigation.223
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Rule 3.6 speaks of prejudice to any adjudicative proceeding, including civil
trials. However, the commentary makes clear that the nature of the proceeding is relevant
to a determination of prejudice, with a prejudicial effect of a statement much less likely in
civil and non-jury trials. The older Model Code specifically precluded a lawyer from
making an extrajudicial statement that would be disseminated relating “to his opinion as
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See Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee v. District Court, City and
County of Denver, 850 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1993) wherein an attorney for an environmental
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-76Sanctions have generally been rejected in the civil litigation context. Attorneys
who bring and speak publicly about civil litigation with the purpose of furthering public
education and public debate are protected by the First Amendment and not subject to
sanction under the Rules of Professional Conduct. The civil litigation problem presents
an analytically different balancing than the tension described by the Model Rules and
cases such as Gentile. The Model Rules and other state rules are premised on a balance
of the Sixth Amendment interests in the fair administration of justice versus the First
Amendment interests of the lawyers and public in speech directed at or likely to influence
juries. But frequently, particularly in the litigation model described in this article,
attorney publicity is not directed at the court at all. Rather it is aimed at influencing nonjudicial actors, general public opinion, executive officials, defendants or industry
officials.224 This type of speech simply does not raise the same type of concerns that
speech by lawyers aimed at helping their clients win a jury verdict does.
More fundamentally, the increasing recognition of the role of litigation in
furthering public debate and shaping public opinion requires that lawyers be accorded the
strongest First Amendment protection in commenting on civil litigation. Several courts
have reached that conclusion. In the 1975 case of Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer,225 the Seventh Circuit held the Model Code’s Disciplinary Rule governing
lawyers’ extrajudicial statements in civil trials unconstitutional. The court noted

Supreme Ct. v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376 (2001); Barley v. Lesjack, 852 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.
1988).
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Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).

-77numerous differences between civil and criminal cases with respect to the likelihood of
lawyers’ extrajudicial speech prejudicing the trial. The court also found the “nature of
certain civil litigation” important:
As plaintiffs indicate, in our present society in any important social issues
become entangled to some degree in civil litigation. Indeed, certain civil
litigation may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information
for the public. Often actions are brought on behalf of the public interest
on a private attorney general theory. Civil litigation in general often
exposes the need for government action or correction. Such revelations
should not be kept from the public. Yet it is normally only the attorney
who will have this knowledge or realize its significance . . . . Therefore,
we should be extremely skeptical about any rule that silences that voice.226
The Fourth Circuit and other courts have been unanimous in reaching the same
conclusion.227
Advocacy in the court of public opinion has become a norm of the legal
profession.228 Many high-powered criminal defense and civil litigators engage in what
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-78one attorney calls “political litigation,” in which they rely on a public relations strategy to
protect their clients’ interests.229 As one commentator notes, “for a public figure, the real
concern from the legal action may not be the legal result but the press coverage.”230 The
reaction to Gentile was to further amend the professional rules to ensure that lawyers’
speech would not be chilled.231 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion discounting the need
for extrajudicial advocacy has been strongly criticized by commentators for failing to
recognize the realities of modern practice.232
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For example, in 1994, the Model Rules were significantly amended to permit
more attorney speech. See Comment, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of Shoes,
44 KAN. L. REV. 837 (1996). See also Committee on Professional Responsibility, Ass’n
of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Need for Fair Trials Does Not Justify a Disciplinary
Rule that Broadly Restricts an Attorney’s Speech, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 881 (1993)
(calling for rule that applies only short time before trial). A number of states tried to
protect the ability of lawyers to speak to the press without fear of discipline. Esther
Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile: Reconsidering the Efficacy of
Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 404, 545 (1993). Colorado changed its rule
from “substantially likely” to “likely to create a grave danger of imminent and substantial
harm.” See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, TRIAL
PUBLICITY 181 (1994) [hereinafter ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL]. Illinois, North
Dakota and Oregon also adopted language requiring imminent harm. See id. See also
Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence is Golden: The New Illinois Rules on Attorney
Extrajudicial Speech, 33 ain LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323 (2002). California, in adopting its
first trial publicity rule, set a “clear and present danger” test. Id.
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-79These developments suggest that a model that views an important function of
litigation to educate the public on matters of important social concern has gained
legitimacy in recent decades. Judicial acceptance of this function should lead to a
recognition that lawyers’ extrajudicial speech in both civil and criminal matters is
legitimate and must be governed by the strict First Amendment clear and present danger
test and not by some lesser standard. A lawyer’s speech on pending litigation performs
an important social and political function protected by the First Amendment, and only
when it can be demonstrated that there is some serious and imminent threat to the fair
administration of justice should that speech be constrained.
IV.

The Courts as Protests for Forum and the Law Dilemma Between Articulation of
Norms and Their Enforcement
One important difference between the courts as forums for protest model and the

public law litigation model set forth by Chayes is the diminished role that judicial relief
plays in the former. The judicial role required by the courts as public forums model is
often significantly more minimalist than that presented by the institutional or structural
law reform model. While the centerpiece of the international law reform model was the
decree which attempts to restructure or change institutions, judges can and do utilize a
myriad of much less assertive mechanisms to aid and not obstruct litigants who seek to
utilize courts as public forums.
The judiciary’s intervention in restructuring or supervising institutions such as
schools, prisons or mental hospitals has been one focus of much of the scholarly and
legislative criticism of and debate over law reform litigation. Indeed, Professor Fiss
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 1; Monroe Freedman, Silencing Defense Lawyers, LEGAL
TIMES, May 6, 1991, at 22.

-80claimed that the core dilemma of structural reform litigation was the tension between
“declaration” of a norm and its “actualization” in a decree.233 Plaintiffs’ use of courts as
forums to further public debate and dialogue presents relatively unexplored and
underutilized alternatives for judges grappling with that dilemma.
There is an inherent dialectic tension between the court’s roles of creating legal
meaning and exercising its power.234 I define the creation of legal meaning to be the
court’s articulation of norms, within the context of particular narratives or stories that
give those norms context and texture. Conversely, the court exercises its power by
ordering or failing to order those brought before it to do something.
These dual functions of the judiciary are both distinct yet inextricably connected.
Normally the Court creates constitutional meaning and articulates constitutional principle
in the context of exercising its power to either grant or deny relief, whether it be in the
form of an equitable decree or award of damages. There are judicial decisions where the
connection between the court’s dual functions are radically separated: a court may issue
an order with no rationales articulating its reasoning, or a court may abstractly articulate
norms with no interest of ever enforcing them. Between these two poles lies a multitude
of gradations.
Plaintiffs who use courts primarily to further a public dialogue or political
movement draw the legal system directly into the political arena, and by doing so strain
233
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-81the connection between the articulation of meaning and the exercise of power. These
forums of protest cases lend themselves to the possibility of a court articulating a
constitutional principle yet refusing to act on that principle in the particular case before it.
The Court would do so to further the plaintiffs’ goal of increasing the public’s
understanding of the constitutional principles involved, to lend its weight and prestige to
the public dialogue on the constitutional values at issue, and to put pressure on Executive
officials or other defendants to comply with its constitutional vision. Yet at the same
time the court would yield to a complex assortment of political, social, ethical, practical
and legal reasons to refuse to order the defendant to comply with the constitutional
principle the court invokes.
I admit that articulating and exploring this potential schizophrenic or dialectical
judicial role in cases wherein the court’s jurisdiction has been invoked at least in part as a
forum for protest leaves me deeply troubled and conflicted. It raises a host of practical
and theoretical questions that go to the heart of our most basic constitutional doctrines
about the role and function of Article III Courts and of judges more generally. Does this
judicial mechanism allow judges to avoid their own struggle between the myriad of
social, psychological, ideological and jurisprudential factors that are involved in making
difficult decisions such as whether to allow the government to execute a prisoner, initiate
a war, or prohibit gay marriage? If used more often, will it provide judges with a
justification to avoid confronting the government’s unconstitutional actions? Does it
constitute an advisory opinion, something forbidden by two centuries of judicial case-orcontroversy doctrine? Will it lead to judicial denunciation of government action in
principle while permitting such action in practice, which as Professor Larry Tribe has

-82noted is inconsistent “with an Anglo-American legal system that has long insisted that
law be composed of enforceable norms” and “seems to teach mostly hypocrisy.”235
Illustrative of the conflict I feel in proposing this court as a “teacher to the
citizenry” approach, is that one of its most articulate and eloquent expositions came from
Alexander Bickel, who argued that the Court must recognize the “passive virtues” of
refusing to decide certain cases. For Bickel,
Even when it is ultimately constrained to yield to necessity, however—to
yield, this is to say, to the judgment of the political institutions—the court
can exert immense influence. It may be unable to wield its ultimate power
as an organ of government charged with translating principle into positive
law: but it need not abandon its concomitant role of “teacher to the
citizenry.” The power to which Marshall successfully laid claim is not the
full measure of the Court’s authority in our day. And the Court’s
arguments need not be compulsory in order to be compelling. Many of the
devices of not doing engage the concept, as I have shown, in colloquies
235
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-83with the political institutions . . . . But the Court . . . can see to it that the
political judgment of necessity is undertaken with awareness of the
principle on which it impinges.236
The Court’s use of the political question doctrine and similar prudential and
jurisdictional devices to avoid reaching difficult constitutional questions is a device that
should be minimized, and not affirmed. Cases presenting deeply felt protests against
important government or corporate policies often present courts with difficult dilemmas
and choices between the demands for justice and the judges’ perceived limitations on
their role, function or ability to confront that injustice. These cases require the Court to
carefully negotiate the ever-changing fault line between what the law is and ought to be,
and not retreat behind formalistic or other jurisprudential rationales to avoid seriously
grappling with the moral and legal issues the cases present.
Yet often the cultural, legal and political milieu of a judge makes such an
approach difficult if not impossible for a judge freighted with the baggage of her era to
actualize. As Robert Cover demonstrated in his book Justice Accused, prominent antislavery judges felt constrained by their era’s jurisprudential tools, or what he termed their
“juristic competence,”—which severely limited their range of responses to the moralformal dilemmas presented by slavery.237 Judges such as John McLean, when confronted
by ideological advocates such as Salmon Chase who challenged the dissonance between
their antislavery ideology and their judicial support for a system that returned runaway
slaves to their owners sought refuge in a set of mainly formalist rationales. While
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-84Cover’s study is a careful analysis of the specific historical, cultural and legal
assumptions and environment facing these judges, it obviously has broader implications.
For throughout American history, judges have continually confronted the moral and legal
dilemmas that Cover addresses, and have often responded with similar rationales of
deference to formal law, or to perceived necessity to defer to political or military choices
made by the Executive or Congress, or fear of too radically challenging an established
constitutional framework and the social order it protects. Cover’s study itself stemmed
from an analogy he had made between judicial complicity in slavery and judicial
acquiescence in the crimes of the Vietnam War. The 20th century has witnessed many
similar judicial articulations of powerlessness when confronted by claims of injustice; the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II,238 the sending of American
soldiers to kill and be killed in Vietnam,239 or a myriad of other challenges to injustice
that were disposed of formalistically with the court eschewing responsibility such as
DeShaney v. Winnebago County,240 McClesky v. Kemp,241 San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,242 or Harris v. McRae.243 Nor has judicial deference to and
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-85acquiescence in the unjustassertion of power by the political branches has not been
confined to judges who articulate positivist, formalist jurisprudence, but has plagued
judges such as Justice Felix Frankfurter steeped in a modern realistic model law. The
perceived needs to defer to power overwhelmed even those Justices such as Brennan and
Marshall who normally fought against narrow, mechanistic legal perspectives, when
confronted with a great intractable national issue such as Vietnam.
In Justice Accused and other works, Cover suggested some approaches that judges
could apply to the dilemmas faced by the anti-slavery judges.244 So too, Professor
Richard Abel’s study of South African judges’ responses to litigation challenging aspects
of the apartheid system in that country illustrates that even in time of great repression in
which a nation’s legal structure supported an unjust social structure, judges do have
choices and can creatively and flexibly work within the fissures and contradictions of the
legal system to undermine, not prop up the unjust regime.245 But might one such creative
and flexible solution to the dilemmas judges face lie in a court’s use of whatever fissure
exists between its power to order compliance with rules, and its authority to set forth the
principles upon which the government and private organizations ought to act? When is it
appropriate for a court to speak truth to power, yet not directly confront power with its

244

For example, in Justice Accused, Cover argued that “in a dynamic model, law
is always becoming. And the judge has a legitimate role in determining what it is that the
law will become. The flux in law means also that the law’s content is frequently unclear.
[T]his frequent lack of clarity makes possible “ameriolist” solutions. The judge may
introduce his own sense of what “ought to be” interstically, where no “hard” law yet
exists. And, he may do so without committing the law to broad doctrinal advances . . . .”
COVER, supra note 75, at 6.
245

RICHARD ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS (1995).

-86own power? Can a court sidesteps a direct confrontation with authority, but nonetheless
get its message heard by the public and the government.
A case that best illustrates the potential usefulness and pitfalls of this approach is
Dellums v. Bush.246 That case involved a challenge by 54 Democratic members of
Congress and one senator to enjoin President George H.W. Bush from going to war
against Iraq to expel it from Kuwait without the congressional authorization required by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. I was the lead counsel for plaintiffs.
The case was filed by Congressman Dellums and the other representatives because they
believed such a war would violate the Constitution, and thought that a court might agree.
But win or lose, they were sure the lawsuit would shake people up and provide an
opportunity to educate the public. Congressman Dellums later recounted his
conversations with members of Congress who were unsure whether they wished to join
the lawsuit as plaintiffs: “I told them even if we don’t win in court, maybe we’ll win in
the courtrooms and living rooms of America, where this case will eventually be tried.”247
The case was assigned to Judge Harold Greene of the District Court of the District
of Columbia. The son of a German-Jewish jeweler, Greene had escaped from the Nazis
with his family in 1939 and came to the United States. After the war and his service in
Army Intelligence, Greene attended law school and joined the Justice Department. A
strong advocate of civil rights, his most lasting contribution as justice was his role in
drafting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Appointed to
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-87the federal bench in 1978 by President Carter, Greene was considered an excellent
judge—smart, fair and in control of the courtroom.
A month after his appointment to the federal bench, Greene was assigned his first,
and probably most important case, United States v. AT&T. For the next six years, Greene
presided over litigation that led in the end to the breakup of the AT&T monopoly over the
telephone industry. He masterfully handled the complex case, which some antitrust
experts thought was too difficult for any single court, rising to the challenge and
dominating the courtroom. Greene was independent, and undaunted by a big political
case.
The pressures and tensions Judge Greene faced in the Dellums case were
enormous. Yet his dilemma was very different from that faced by Judge McClean when
confronting Chase in the Van Zandt case. Judges like McClean were torn by their
obligations to uphold what they saw as a static, formal law and their moral duty as antislavery advocates. In Van Zandt and other cases, McLean chose the former.
At oral argument, Judge Greene was clearly troubled by his inclination that the
formal law—the Constitution’s text and the framers’ intent—strongly supported the
plaintiffs’ position that the Executive did not have the unilateral power to initiate a major
armed conflict which under any plausible definition, was a war. As a judge and strong
advocate of fidelity to the Constitution, Greene clearly did not want to evade his
obligations to enforce what he viewed as a clear constitutional provision. “What I am
interested in finding out,” Greene calmly asked the Justice Department attorney arguing
the case, “is whether a clause in the Constitution, not some blank space in the
Constitution or some interpretation but an actual clause in the Constitution, can be

-88enforced, or is it simply up to the President either to ignore it or abide by it?”248 Greene
seemed unsatisfied by the answer he got.
Despite Judge Greene’s apparent view that the executive position was inconsistent
with the Constitution’s command, the practical, political and constitutional realities must
have pressed on him. The case was argued against a backdrop of a deeply divided
Congress and nation where neither the congressional Democratic leadership nor the
President was willing to call a special session to vote on authorization for war. The U.N.
Security Council had voted 12-2, with China abstaining, to authorize the United States
and its allies to use “all necessary means,” a euphemism for force, to expel Iraq from
Kuwait.249 Less than a week before the argument, President Bush dropped a diplomatic
bombshell. At a news conference, Bush announced that he had invited Iraq’s foreign
minister to Washington, and offered to send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad “to
reach a peaceful solution” to the Persian Gulf crisis.250 While Congressman Dellums and
other observers saw the diplomatic maneuverings as mostly show, nonetheless, a judge
would be reluctant to issue an injunction while diplomatic efforts were under way. What
if a court’s injunction stiffened Hussein’s resolve and led to the breakdown of
negotiations? Any judge deciding the case would shoulder a heavy burden.
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-89Moreover, Judge Greene must have felt some conflict as to the underlying
substantive policy to be followed toward Iraq. For Greene, while liberal in domestic
affairs, was, according to a former clerk who knew him well, an admirer of former
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s hawkish views on foreign policy.
Most important was the reality that judges have been virtually unanimous in
refusing to interfere with the U.S. military operations. At oral argument, Judge Greene
demonstrated an awareness of that reality when he asked whether any court at any point
in American history had ever enjoined United States military action.251 The answer is no,
with one exception; that of Judge Judd who enjoined the U.S. bombing of Cambodia in
1973.252 His injunction was stayed within hours by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
which eventually reversed his decision a few months later.253
A similar decision by Judge Greene in the Dellums case would undoubtedly have
suffered the same fate. Moreover Judge Greene could have worried about its effect on
the ongoing drama then unfolding in the Middle East.
Greene came up with a creative solution. His decision, announced a month before
the deadline set by the U.N. for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, rejected the government’s
constitutional arguments and most of its jurisdictional and prudential arguments.
Greene decisively rejected the Justice Department’s political question defense,
stating:
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-90If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular
offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute “warmaking” but only an “offensive military attack,” the congressional power
to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the
Executive. Such an interpretation would evade the plain language of the
Constitution, and it cannot stand.254
Greene held that a U.S. assault on Iraq would be war, within the meaning of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 11, and announced that “the court is not prepared to read out of the
Constitution the clause granting to the Congress, and to it alone, the authority to declare
war.”255 He went on to hold that the plaintiffs had standing, that the court had the
equitable power to grant relief and concluded that, in principle, a court could issue an
injunction at the request of members of Congress to prevent the conduct of a war that was
about to be launched without congressional authorization.
Nonetheless, Greene concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive
relief because the controversy was not ripe. Greene held that the President was not so
clearly committed to military action against Iraq to make the case ripe for injunctive
relief. More important, Greene said that the judicial branch should not decide issues
affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress if only a minority
of Congress seeks relief. Only where a majority of Congress has disapproved a
president’s claim to use force does a ripe controversy exist, for only then, Greene held,
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-91are the President and Congress locked in such deadlocked conflict that a court should
intervene.
Greene did not dismiss the case; he only denied plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. He seemed to invite congressional action disapproving Bush’s
move to war and stated that, should Congress take such action, plaintiffs could come back
to court.
Both sides claimed victory: on Nightline, Dellums praised Judge Greene’s
rejection of the Justice Department’s sweeping war powers claims.256 The government
correctly pointed out that technically Greene’s decision imposed no limit on the
President’s prerogatives. “The bottom line,” said the Justice Department attorney Stuart
Gerson, “is we won.”257
The academic community reacted positively to Greene’s decision. Harold Koh,
the author of a brief filed on plaintiffs’ behalf by a group of prominent law professors,
termed the decision an unappealable declaratory judgment against the government.258
John Hart Ely, a signer of that brief, wrote an essay entitled “Two Cheers For Judge
Greene.”259
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-92The media could not declare a clear winner to the Dellums case, juxtaposing
headlines like “Judge Finds Bush Can’t Go to War Alone” with subtitles, in smaller type,
reading “But Says It’s Premature to Order President to Get Congressional OK.”260 The
Los Angeles Times reversed the captions, starting with “U.S. Judge Refuses to Block
Bush From Starting a War” and then adding “But He Also Says Only Congress Can
Authorize an Attack on Iraq.”261 The N.Y. Times noted that, while Greene had rejected
the legislators’ request for an injunction, “his ruling was also a significant rejection of the
Bush Administration’s position that it need do nothing more than consult with Congress
before going to war.”262
For Ron Dellums, however, the lawsuit was a clear success. He focused on the
political climate the case had helped create. “I’m convinced that the main reason Bush
eventually came to Congress was because of our lawsuit,” Dellums emphatically told me.
“The lawsuit brought our struggle front and center, brought the Constitution front and
center, and brought the Persian Gulf buildup front and center.” Judge Greene’s holding
that “the Court is not prepared to read Congress’ war powers out of the Constitution”
gave us momentum to force Bush to come to Congress. “Everyone felt buoyed by the
decision.” The congressman’s aide Lee Halterman felt that a “sea change” took place in
Congress after Greene’s opinion was announced. While Dellums had not stopped the
war, Bush was forced to come to Congress, and Congress debated and voted on whether
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-93to go to war. “For me that was a victory,” Dellums claims.263 Our purpose in bringing
the lawsuit had been, in large part, to spur political action. From that perspective, Judge
Greene had written a masterful decision, probably the best he could have rendered.
Greene had told the president that he couldn’t go to war alone. But his decision
also took Congress to task for avoiding its responsibility and for contributing to the
constitutional crisis through its refusal to vote on Bush’s war. In effect, Greene was
telling Congress to show some backbone of its own if it wanted him to enjoin the
president. The whole decision put political and legal heat on both Congress and the
president to act, and the fact that Greene had not dismissed our case meant that, if
Congress did show some courage and voted to stop Bush, we could be back in court.
Dellums decided not to appeal Greene’s decision.
Yet I remain troubled and conflicted by Greene’s approach. Certainly Judge
Greene’s approach was preferable to that of the other District Court Judge who heard a
solider’s objection to the pending Persian Gulf War at the same time and who broadly
dismissed his claim as presenting a non-justiciable political question.264 Moreover, had
Judge Greene enjoined the President from going to war without congressional
authorization, his decision would have certainly been appealed and undoubtedly reversed.
But might that have been preferable. Such an injunction certainly would have raised the
constitutional issue to the foreground of the public debate, and in a manner where the
meaning of the Executive’s constitutional violation was clearer. It would have placed the
court’s money where its mouth was: the court’s commitment to its constitutional ruling
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-94would have been clear. Perhaps the best answer is that the acceptability of Greene’s
approach is dependent on the factual circumstances confronting the court. Given the
circumstances Greene faced, in hindsight I cannot say he reached a bad result.
Greene’s approach in Dellums has a long pedigree in American history. Certainly
the most famous and celebrated use of this general technique was Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison where he first held that the Jefferson
Administration had unconstitutionally deprived Marbury of his judicial commission and
that the court could remedy that violation by issuing a mandamus against high Executive
officials. Only then did the court determine that it was without the jurisdiction to do so
because the statute providing such jurisdiction was unconstitutional. Jefferson firmly
believed that the court’s discussion of Marbury’s right to a commission and the propriety
of a court-issued mandamus against cabinet officials was “obiter dissertation,”265 and it
was this part of the opinion that aroused the greatest attack by Republicans.266 Indeed, it
was Marshall’s dicta condemning the President’s actions, and not his assertion of the
principle of judicial review of legislative acts that received most of the press attention at
the time.267 Marshall certainly intended to send the message that the President was acting
unlawfully, at the very time he was avoiding a direct confrontation with the political
branches. His opinion has aptly been termed, “a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant
example of Marshall’s capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it, to advance
265
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-95in one direction while his opponents are looking in another.”268 Like Greene’s opinion,
Marshall’s tactical brilliance in Marbury lay at least in part in his taking advantage of the
always potential tension between the court’s role in creating meaning and its function of
exercising power.269
Examples of similar judicial strategies of creating meaning while declining to
exercise judicial power appear in other cases. While the initial Vietnam War cases
simply dismissed soldier or citizen complaints as posing broad political questions or on
other jurisdictional grounds, as the war dragged on, a few courts, such as the D.C.
Circuit, spoke out clearly against the constitutionality of the war, while still dismissing
the lawsuit. In Mitchell v. Laird, the respected jurists Judge Wyzanski and Chief Judge
Bazelon held the Vietnam War unconstitutional, despite congressional funding for the
war, writing “this court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in
voting to appropriate money or to draft men a congressman is not necessarily approving
of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically that appropriation or draft act
refers to that war.”270 The court nonetheless refused to enjoin the continuing war,
holding that the question of whether President Nixon was proceeding in good faith to
promptly end that unconstitutional war was a non-justiciable political question. The
268
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-96court’s statement of what “every schoolboy knows,” was shortly thereafter written into
the War Powers Resolution, when Congress enacted that law over President Nixon’s veto
later in 1973.271
Courts have at times introduced changes in legal doctrines by articulating legal
limitations without granting the relief sought by the particular party before the court.272
Similarly, the Supreme Court has in a variety of different contexts recognized the validity
and necessity of ignoring the general rule that a court should avoid deciding difficult
constitutional questions when the decision can rest on alternative grounds and instead
encouraged lower courts to decide a constitutional issue that may even be irrelevant to the
disposition of a case in order to instruct the citizenry and public officials as to the
Constitution’s meaning.273 Another situation that contains traces of the same approach is
what my colleague Arthur Hellman terms oppositive dictum, where a court denies relief,
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-97but states that in a different set of circumstances it might or would reach a different
result.274
There are a myriad of mechanisms that a court can use to indicate support for a
legal norm to the broader legal and political community, yet refuse to enforce such a rule.
One historical example is the Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on Salmon Chase’s
broad constitutional claim that a slave became free the moment her master brought her to
Ohio, yet its signaling its agreement with his argument by having it printed and widely
publicized.275 The court’s decisions in Brown v. Bd. of Education contain aspects of the
same dichotomy between norm articulation and norm enforcement, in its strong and
unanimous rejection of segregation as a constitutional norm yet refusal to order any relief
for the Black plaintiffs except its later dictate that the southern states should adopt
desegregation plans with “all deliberate speed,” which turned out to be an illusory effort
to avoid using the full force of the court’s coercive power to compel compliance.
Supreme Court decisions since Brown have sometimes “attached as much significance, or
more, to the symbolism of laws as to their more tangible or material consequences.”276
The fundamental problem with this general rubric is its separation between legal
meaning and the commitment to live by and enforce that meaning. As Robert Cover
pointed out, law cannot exist apart from both a legal narrative and a commitment to that
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-98law.277 To Lon Fuller, unenforced norms strain the concept of “rule of law,” because
“congruence between official action and declared rule” is an essential part of “the internal
morality” of law.278 Similarly Professor Tribe argues that the articulation of norms for
symbolic purposes that are not enforced breeds a hypocrisy and cynicism that undermines
the rule of law in the Anglo-American tradition.279 Professor Fiss rejected an approach
that would resolve the core dilemma in structural reform litigation by confining the judge
to the declaration of rights and not their enforcement because it “would require a
detachment or an indifference to this world.”280 Less philosophically and more
doctrinally, the law pronouncement approach is in tension with Article III courts rejection
of advisory opinions and their avoidance of deciding difficult constitutional issues unless
absolutely necessary.281
The answer to the doctrinal problem is fairly straightforward. The advisory
opinion doctrine prevents a court from adjudicating hypothetical or moot issues or
controversies between adverse parties not before the court.282 It does not prevent the
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-99court from articulating the law governing an issue, nor from deciding an issue in
plaintiff’s favor yet denying relief on other grounds. The rule does not mandate any
particular order of deciding issues, it merely requires that the issues be presented by
adverse parties alleging an actual dispute.283
Nor does the principle, developed in the context of statutory interpretation, of not
deciding difficult constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so, preclude the
articulation of principle approach suggested here. The Supreme Court has recognized in
a number of areas the propriety of addressing an important constitutional question before
turning to another, potentially dispositive issue.284 The value of avoiding difficult
constitutional questions is not absolute and must be balanced against the competing value
of providing guidance to the other branches of government. For example, in its decision
to create a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the court held that “[t]here is no
need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers’
conduct manifested objective good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth
Amendment has been violated.”285 Noting that “courts have considerable discretion in
conforming their decision-making processes to the exigencies of particular cases,” the
Court stated that “[i]f the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is
JAY 486-89 (H. Johnston ed., 1981) (setting forth Jay’s view of the advisory opinion
doctrine).
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-100necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing
will prevent reviewing courts from deciding that question before turning to the good faith
issue.286
The more troubling problem is therefore the objection that by articulating a rule
without enforcing it in the particular case, the court states “no more than the proclamation
of an admittedly unworkable moral idea.”287 Professor Scharpf’s criticism of Bickel
captures the essence of the quandary inhering in the Court’s lack of commitment to the
principle it articulates:
What would be the persuasiveness of an interpretation of the Constitution
which the interpreter himself could not wish to see put into practice?
From what revelation should the Court derive authority to proclaim moral
postulates—or have its judgments any legitimacy beyond that of an
intellectual honesty disciplined by its responsibility for the disposition of
the concrete case?
It would sacrifice that realism of constitutional interpretation which is the
necessary condition of its effectiveness. Interpretation which would no
longer be answerable to the real conditions and exigencies of community
life would transform constitutional law into a collection of programmatic
postulates to be worshiped on the Fourth of July; and the easier it would
be for the Court to retreat from conflicts in the real world into the ideal
realm of pure principle, the less ready and able would it be to protect the
community against transgression of its fundamental code.288
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-101It may well be that the enunciation of a principle without a commitment to
enforce it would have the effect that Scharpf describes and cannot be considered law but
mere rhetoric. But a judge’s commitment to a principle he or she articulates cannot be
measured in pure all or nothing terms—as Scharpf suggests. Rather judicial commitment
comes in all shades and hues, just as the community’s commitment to its narratives of
law can take many forms.
As Robert Cover points out in Norms and Narrative, there is a difference between
the commitment demonstrated by a community that “writes law review articles”—forcing
the officialdom to maintain its interpretation “merely by suffering the protest of the
articles,” and a community that disobeys the criminal law, forcing judges to affirm the
official interpretation of law only by committing violence against the protestor.289 To
Cover, however, both communities demonstrate a commitment to create and maintain
law. We certainly cheer more loudly for the civil resister; law review authors win no
Noble prizes. One clearly has a stronger commitment than the other, but neither is
merely dishonestly evoking an unworkable moral ideal. The soldier who retreats in the
face of a massive and uncontainable enemy assault in order to take up a more defensible
position from which to fight may have no less a commitment to his nation’s cause than
the soldier who stands fast and dies. So too, judicial commitment to constitutional liberty
and justice takes many forms, and cannot be measured simply by the heroic judge who
affirms justice at the peril of his office, his legitimacy, or his life. Certainly history’s
verdict is conclusive that Chief Justice Marshall’s dicta in Marbury that high Executive
officials are not above the law has certainly been accorded as much legitimacy as if
289
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-102Marshall had ordered Marbury appointed—certainly if the result of that decision would
have been that Jefferson refused and the Supreme Court’s authority decisively weakened.
Judge Greene, while refusing to enforce the clear constitutional command that Congress
authorize war (in my opinion wrongly), nonetheless kept jurisdiction over Dellums claim
and suggested that given the right circumstances in the future, he would (or more aptly
might) enforce the law. Had a majority of Congress voted down the authorization for war
when the President finally placed the issue before them in early January 1991, and had
President Bush nonetheless proceeded to initiate war as he later indicated he would have
done,290 Greene might have enforced Article I had a soldier or representative of Congress
so requested. What Judge Greene would have done in that not purely hypothetical
scenario291 is conjecture—quite possibly he would have found yet another way to avoid
issuing an injunction. But certainly his opinion left open that possibility, and was not
purely abstract moralizing. It is not hard to see why, when another congressional war
powers challenge to Executive war making was made some years later, the plaintiffs
again sought to draw Judge Greene, despite his refusal to grant relief in the Dellums case.
The question of whether those who act as Judge Greene did are affirming or
avoiding their constitutional responsibilities, must, in the final analysis, be determined on
a case-by-case basis given the context and circumstances of each case and an analysis of
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-103the Court’s specific decision. My point here is not to fashion a sweeping proposition
either affirming or denying the validity of such judicial action. Rather it is that
particularly in cases where the litigation functions in whole or part as a forum for public
debate, judges should consider it as an option. That is especially true if the judge is
disposed to permit an injustice to continue because of her reading of formal law or of the
practical necessities of the situation. In some cases, a judge’s resort to this option may
have the effect that Scharpf describes and make judges less ready and able to protect the
community against transgressions of its fundamental code. In others, it might help spur
the political movement in ways that may be more important than obtaining judicial relief.
How judges craft their opinion can help or harm the political or social movement of
which the plaintiff is but a representative. Congressman Dellums certainly felt that Judge
Greene helped his.
Robert Cover ended his book Justice Accused with an insight about judges that,
“If a man makes a good priest, we may be quite sure he will not be a great prophet.”292
That insight sounds right, but it may also be true that a good priest may be able to aid,
instead of obstruct those that are prophets. Judges are seldom great prophets, but the best
can prove very valuable and helpful to a prophetic or redemptive constitutional
movement that has as its primary arena not the courtroom, but the streets.
V.

The Role of Lawyers in the Public Forum Model
That litigation can often have as a primary or significant purpose or effect

political mobilization and education outside the courtroom yields important insights for
lawyers as well as judges. This model of litigation radically redefines the role of a
292
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-104lawyer. The lawyer in presenting his or her case does not act as the neutral detached
advocate posited by the traditional model, nor even the less detached, elite, sympathetic
and empathetic legal expert of the law reform model. Rather, the lawyer ought to be not
simply for the movement, but in and of the political or social movement he or she
represents; “a lawyer can join the client as a comrade and serve as a legal advisor.”293
Activist attorneys often use the term “movement lawyer” to express what they do and
how they view their role. For example, prominent socialist, labor activist attorney
Staughton Lynd derived his legal role from the notion of “accompaniment” used by
liberation theologians in Latin America. This meant a duty to accompany workers in
their struggle for justice, to help them articulate their interests and express their anger,
and to present their vision of a more just and ultimately socialistic society.294 Many
lawyers who bring litigation for broader political purposes straddle the line between
lawyer and political activist, as did Salmon Chase, Staughton Lynd, or well-known civil
rights lawyer Arthur Kinoy.
This conception of a lawyer’s role leads to somewhat different legal
decisionmaking and strategies from that posited by either the traditional dispute
resolution or institutional litigation models. First, the decision as to whether to bring a
case, make an argument, or raise a claim cannot be based solely, or at times even
primarily on an analysis of the legal merits. As Professor Arthur Kinoy, a leading civil
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-105rights litigator of the 1950s, 60s and 70s explained in his autobiographical book, Rights
on Trial
the test of success for a people’s lawyer is not always the technical
winning or losing of the formal proceeding. Again and again, the real test
was the impact of the legal activities on the morale and understanding of
the people involved in the struggle. To the degree that the legal work
helped to develop a sense of strength, an ability to fight back, it was
successful. This could even be achieved without reaching the objective of
formal victory. . . .295
Thus, for Kinoy, the decision whether to bring a lawsuit could not be based solely
on “the likelihood of success within the court structure.”296 Rather, the question was
what role the lawsuit would play in the people’s struggle. “If it helped the fight, then it
was done, even if the chances of immediate legal success were virtually nonexistent.”297
This approach requires such movement lawyers to take risks in bringing cases that
present difficult, uphill battles and could create bad precedents. For many traditional law
reform litigators, such as former NAACP Legal Defense Fund general counsel Jack
Greenberg, test cases generally “should not be brought if they are likely to be lost.”298 To
be sure, the likely legal success of a case should be carefully considered before it is
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-106brought, and the risk of precedent should be weighed, but under the public protest model
of reform litigation that cannot be the sole or, at times even the primary consideration.
For example, in Danville, South Carolina, Kinoy and William Kunstler, another
prominent civil rights attorney, pioneered the use of the long-dormant federal removal
statute to prevent state prosecutions of civil rights activists. Jack Greenberg, then the
legal director of the NAACP Inc. Fund, completely rejected the idea of using this old
Reconstruction-era statute to stop the state court trials of the demonstrators, calling it a
crazy idea amounting to “playing with the courts.”299 But, despite the reservations of
many of the lawyers, and the lack of legal precedent, Kinoy and Kunstler decided to try,
for there were no other good alternatives and the civil rights movement was pressing for
some legal action. Miraculously, Kinoy and the other Danville lawyers temporarily won
an injunction in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.300
Similarly, when the first Holocaust restitution lawsuit was filed in October 1996
against the Swiss banks, most legal observers viewed the suit as a “sure loser.”301 Yet the
suit obviously had a political motive to create public embarrassment and put political
pressure on the Swiss banks by exposing their role in the Holocaust. The suit, a “legal
loser,” succeeded in that aim. Less than two years later, the Swiss banks were willing to
pay $1.25 billion to end the litigation.302
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-107Most cases brought in the face of unfavorable precedent undoubtedly lose in
court. They therefore may create bad precedent, although in most instances they simply
pile more bad precedent on an already poor situation. Some cases do contain a silver
lining when the judges draft their opinions in a manner to create room for the law to grow
and develop despite the defeat in court.303 But generally, while the risk of creating bad
precedent ought clearly to be weighed before litigation is commenced, lawyers ought not
to allow a fear of losing to paralyze their work, stifle creativity or make them overly
cautious. The courts as forums for protest therefore balances the risk of creating bad
precedent against the other, more political aims of the lawsuit differently than either of
the other models, with a recognition that the aim of litigation at times extends beyond
winning or losing in court.
Another critical lesson posed by the courts as forums of protests is that public
interest lawyers must draft their complaints and argue their cases before the courts based
not simply or at times primarily on the technical, sound legal arguments, but on the broad
moral/political themes that will resonate with their clients, the political movement they
represent, the general public, and often judges. Salmon Chase and the other anti-slavery
lawyers understood this when they framed their legal arguments as broad moral and
constitutional broadsides against slavery. These arguments might not and in fact did not
convince a court, but were very effective anti-slavery arguments because they
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-108emphasized both the immorality of slavery and the absolute incongruity of democracy
and slavery.304
The Shelley v. Kraemer case presents another example of a lawyer making a
broad moral/political argument which might make an impression on a judge, but will
more likely resonate in the public debate. George Vaughn, a municipal court lawyer in
St. Louis who had brought the Shelley case to the Supreme Court despite Thurgood
Marshall’s objections that the time was not right for Supreme Court review of the issue
argued the restrictive covenant cases along with Marshall.305 Philip Elman, an attorney in
the Solicitor General’s office who helped draft the government’s brief in Shelley and
attended the oral arguments recounts Vaughn’s argument:
[H]e made an argument that as a professional piece of advocacy was not
particularly distinguished. You might even say it was poor. He mainly
argued the thirteenth amendment, which wasn’t before the Court. He tried
to distinguish cases when it was clear that the cases were indistinguishable
and the only way to deal with them was to ignore or overrule them. It was
a dull argument until he came to the very end. He concluded his argument
by saying . . . “Now I’ve finished my legal argument, but I want to say this
before I sit down. In this Court, this house of law, the Negro today stands
outside, and he knocks on the door, over and over again, he knocks on the
door and cries out, ‘Let me in, let me in, for I too have helped build this
house.’”
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-109All of a sudden there was drama in the courtroom, a sense of what the case
was really all about rather than the technical legal arguments. . . . [It was]
the most moving plea in the Court I’ve ever heard.306
Vaughn was so inspiring that he was invited to repeat his speech at the 1948 Democratic
National Convention.307
The examples of George Vaughn making broad emotional/political arguments and
poorly arguing or ignoring the technical legal distinctions that are the daily grist of an
appellate lawyers’ life are extreme. In many cases, it is precisely the broad
moral/political/legal arguments that place more technical, legal points in their proper
context, and if made properly can influence both the judges hearing the case and the
broad public to whom the lawyer seeks to appeal. Many more polished and experienced
oral advocates than Vaughn have recognized that to strike a chord with both the judges
one needs to convince and the public one often has to cut through the technical legal
underbrush with a broad plea to justice and morality. For example, Harold Koh who
argued the Haitian Refugee case before the Supreme Court started his argument with a
broad plea about the injustice of the United States’ policy, hoping that his opening might
convince the Court to view his technical arguments more favorably, but recognizing that
even if it did not, it would appeal to his broader audience.308
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-110Public interest lawyers also have to look at the interaction between the litigation
and broader interests of their clients and the movements they represent, not only in
arguing their cases, but in drafting complaints. Many lawyers feel constrained in drafting
pleadings by their perception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirement of
notice pleadings,309 the constraints of professional standards and the rules learned theory
of their legal education. They therefore draft complaints that lose the details, passion and
identity of their clients, the “thickness” of her story and oppression.310 For example, in
litigation filed recently challenging a particularly outrageous case of the Federal
government’s anti-terrorism policy run amok, an experienced and excellent attorney cited
the Federal Rules notice pleading requirement to request that the lawyers who had drafted
the complaint cut out alot of the detail. That detail had provided a rich and vivid account
of the oppression the client had encountered. While the complaint could undoubtedly
have been improved through editing, it needed to tell the client’s full narrative, so that
both the judge assigned to the case would comprehend its full outrage, but additionally so
that the media, and the public will understand his dramatic and compelling story.311
The forum for protest model of courts therefore compels a lawyer to think not
only of the technical arguments that will win in court, but what arguments will serve the
movement he or she is working with. The model is therefore much more receptive to
transformative arguments that look beyond the winning or losing the particular legal

309

FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

310

Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J.763 (1995).
311

Elman & Silber, supra note 306, at 771-72.

-111battle and serve to transform political consciousness and reshape the way legal conflicts
are represented in the law.312
While urging lawyers to pay attention to the broader political aims of their clients
and political movements when they draft complaints and argue before courts may temper
some of the limitations of law reform litigation articulated by the Critical Legal Studies
Movement and other progressive scholars, it raises new contradictions. Those new
tensions are generated by what often is a conflict between broad political, moral or legal
arguments and the often narrow terrain that courts and law forces lawyers to work in.
That conflict envelops many law reform cases, particularly those in which the lawyers’
and litigants’ goals are broader than just winning in court.
For example, in 1984 the prominent human rights lawyer Michael Ratner brought
a case on behalf of Congressman Michael Barnes and a number of other Democratic
Congressmen challenging President Reagan’s pocket veto of legislation that would have
required a certification that human rights were improving in El Salvador.313 His real
interest, and the interest of many of the human rights groups and members of Congress
supporting the lawsuit was to eventually stop the flow of U.S. aid to the Salvadoran
government, whose human rights record was atrocious. Nevertheless, the case, in which
the entire House of Representatives and Senate eventually joined as plaintiffs only raised
a narrow legal argument of whether the President had the constitutional power to pocket-

312

Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 965 (2001); Peter Gabel & Paul
Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of
Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1983).
313

Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d, Barnes v. Kline, 759
F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacate as moot, Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).

-112veto legislation. While that question was an important separation of powers issue, as the
case dragged on through the lengthy appellate process, for Rather and many other human
rights activists, the case lost much of its political meaning. After the Court of Appeals
decided in plaintiffs’ favor and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Ratner
decided not to argue it before the Court, deferring to his co-counsel. While most
litigators would jump at the chance to argue before the Supreme Court, to Ratner, “the
idea that I would put aside weeks and months to brief and argue this highly technical case
while I was at the height of my political organizing was absurd.”314 The Supreme Court
eventually decided the case had become moot because the statutory period within which
the certification would have been effective had elapsed.315
Ratner’s conflict was an extreme case of the reform lawyer’s dilemma. The
litigation forum often channels legal argument into forms that are likely to persuade a
judge, but are not necessarily what the lawyers, litigants or political movements believe
represent justice. For example, Professor Charles Lawrence has discussed this dilemma
in the context of whether and how to support the diversity defense of affirmative action
when in the short run it is the course most like to succeed in the contemporary judicial
climate yet it leaves unchallenged and indeed affirms a university’s role in perpetuating
and entrenching a privileged elite. For the lawyer using the courts as a forum to both
protest and hopefully ultimately transform the social, political and economic injustices of
our society the dilemma is particularly acute, for he or she, unlike the theorist must work
daily in that arena. For that lawyer, one question is how to introduce what Lawrence
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-113terms “transformative arguments” into litigation, and use that litigation to thus inform the
political dialogue.316 Generally, the institutional law reform model does not address this
dilemma, because this problem focuses more on the relationship between lawyers and the
political movements they work with and less on the role of the judge in a particular case.
For some constitutional theorists, the solution is to abandon the effort to articulate
progressive, transformative or aspiration norms in the courts.317 Some civil rights
litigators, however reject that approach and continue to view litigation not merely as a
means to transform institutions, but as one forum among many to raise questions that
may eventual transform contemporary, mainstream political dialogue.
This question was starkly presented in litigation challenging U.S. Steel’s plan
closings in Youngstown, Ohio in the late 1970s. An attorney in that case, Staughton
Lynd, had articulated a promissory estoppel theory that he believed was supported by
contract law. U.S. Steel had made a promise to keep the Youngstown mills open if they
could be made profitable. The workers had agreed to a variety of concessions, worked
hard, and relied on that promise to their detriment, yet U.S. Steel had breached its
promise. That theory in Lynd’s view, both articulated the worker’s feelings of injustice
and posed a radical challenge to traditional management rights.
But the district court judge raised a much more radical theory that perhaps the
Youngstown community had acquired some vested property rights in U.S. Steel “from
the lengthy, long-established relationship between United States Steel, . . . the community
316
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-114in Youngstown . . . in having given and devoted their lives to this industry.”318
Ultimately the judge had concluded that there was no legal precedent for such a property
right, dismissed the “property right” claim and found that U.S. Steel had not breached
any promise to keep the mills running.
The workers appealed and Lynd wrote a brief arguing for the worker’s contract
claim. But Lynd could not write a brief arguing for a community property right for
which there was no precedent. Lynd’s socialist politics led him to the belief that, while
he could use the law to win concrete victories and raise issues, he also felt that the
limitations of capitalist laws had to be recognized, understood, and explained. While
Lynd was perfectly willing to bring a “prophetic” case for which there was some legal
precedent, even if for political reasons the case would likely lose, he was unwilling to
argue a case with no supporting precedent. The role of a radical labor lawyer, Lynd
thought, is to articulate the workers’ feelings of injustice in a manner that the law could
recognize. If the law did not recognize the workers’ complaint as actionable, then the
lawyer’s role was to tell the workers that and to develop another strategy for fighting the
injustice.
But, though Lynd was unwilling to argue the community property right issue to
the Court of Appeals, there was a respected national legal group and a prominent national
lawyer willing to fill the void. The Center for Constitutional Rights submitted an amicus
brief, signed by Arthur Kinoy, a professor at Rutgers Law School, that argued for a
community property right to prevent a company in U.S. Steel’s position from unilaterally
deciding to close mills vital to that community.
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-115Kinoy’s approach to the dilemma presented by “transformative arguments”
differed from Lynd’s. Local unions were actively engaged in struggle, raising
fundamental questions of whether the Constitution protected not merely civil and
political rights but also economic rights. Irrespective of whether legal precedent
supported a community property right, Kinoy believed that people’s lawyers had to find
and use whatever they could to argue that the Constitution supported such rights—a
position that would help motivate workers across America to struggle against plant
closing. He hoped that the mass labor movement around plant closings would have the
same impact as the civil rights movement had on the courts in the 1960s.
While Lynd’s approach recognizes the limits of law and using litigation both to
advance particular struggle and to help explain, educate and expose the nature of
capitalist law, for Kinoy, the law and the Constitution are fundamentally indeterminate
vessels, with their meaning determined not by legal precedent but by the political struggle
of masses of people. Articulating radical rights such as economic and social rights both
in the context of litigation as well as political forums can, for Kinoy, motivate thousands
of people to struggle for those rights which in turn will impact upon the courts. For
Kinoy, the paradigm for this courts as forums for protest model was the mass, democratic
civil rights struggle during the 1960s, during which period he articulated radical,
transformative notions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments which at times
were accepted by the courts.319
The different approaches to law and constitutional rights taken by Kinoy and
Lynd reflect longstanding tensions in the radical movement’s view of the Constitution
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-116and of litigation that commenced with the split within the abolitionist movement over
whether the Constitution, properly interpreted, outlawed slavery. Lynd sympathized with
the abolitionists who had accurately viewed the Constitution as having accepted slavery
and thus had called on anti-slavery judges to resign, as opposed to those abolitionists,
such as Alvan Stewart, who had proposed radical reinterpretations of the Constitution
based on theories of natural law and natural rights. Kinoy’s view hued closer to that of
Alvan Stewart and Senator Charles Summer who argued in court and elsewhere that the
Constitution should always be interpreted in favor of liberty, equality, and human rights.
My intellectual predilection lies more with Lynd’s approach, which captures
critical theory’s emphasis on exposing the contradictions and limitations of law.
However, Kinoy was able to use his approach in the 1960s to help use litigation to
mobilize thousands of civil rights activists and law students to engage in potentially
transformative litigation. What this suggests is that solutions to the dilemma must come
in a case by case contextual context, and that in some eras and cases Kinoy’s approach
may have the invaluable effect he sought. It didn’t in the plant closing case. Perhaps the
Courts as Forums for Protest model main contribution is simply to articulate it and the
dilemma of attempting to make transformative arguments in the context of litigation,
force litigators to attempt to grapple with it and not ignore the problem.
Finally, lawyers who undertake this type of litigation must be both willing to
support their clients’ political actions and mount public educational campaigns that
dovetail and interface with the litigation.320 Yet often clients’ political actions cause
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-117problems with a law reformer’s carefully calibrated legal/political strategy. For example,
in the Haiti refugee litigation, the Haitians’ hunger strike pushed the popular mobilization
beyond the “legal team’s grand plan.”321 While the strike led to a very successful
organizing effort and educational effort around the case, but caused division amongst the
legal team as to whether the strike and resulting publicity was helpful or harmful.
I conclude with a discussion of the litigation brought on behalf of the prisoners
being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This important litigation fits
comfortably within the Courts as forums for protests model, and illustrates many of the
insights and contradictions of the model.
In early 2002, the Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the Bush
Administration’s detention of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners at Guantanamo
Bay without affording them the protections or rights due under the Geneva Convention.
At the time, many individuals and organizations were timid about openly challenging the
Administration’s anti-terrorism policies. Moreover, a case on behalf of the Guantanamo
detainees presented a particularly difficult context within to challenge the Administration.
These prisoners had been captured in and around Afghanistan as part of a popular war
effort. The memory of September 11 was fresh on people’s minds. The government
claimed that what they were doing at Guantanamo was necessary to defend American
national security and prevent future terrorist attacks, a claim that resonates particularly
strongly with courts. Most important, Johnson v. Eisentragger322 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1950 held that non-resident enemy aliens convicted of war crimes after
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-118a military trial detained by the United States government outside the United States
territory in time of war had no right or privilege to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of
a United States court to challenge their detentions.
While the legal and political climate was bleak, the CCR attorneys believed that
Johnson was distinguishable and that it was possible to win in court. The CCR decided
to take the risk.323 The government’s position was in clear violation of the Geneva
Conventions and was in effect saying that no law applied to these detainees. But the
CCR’s objective went beyond winning or losing in court. Its objective was to
demonstrate that there was resistance to U.S. policy, to help publicize the injustice to and
plight of the detainees, to keep the issue of the detainees in the public mind and to help
use of the case as part of a broader political movement against the Administration’s antiterrorism policies. The decision to litigate was not based on whether the CCR attorneys
thought the litigation had a good chance of winning in court.
The CCR first filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights of the Organization of American States, which ruled that the Guantanamo
prisoners may not be held “entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States
government,” and that the government must accord those prisoners a hearing to
determine their legal status under the Geneva Convention.324 The Bush Administration
predictably refused to comply with the Commission’s ruling. Indeed, given the certainty
that the Administration would not comply with any unfavorable Commission ruling, the
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-119purpose of the complaint was to obtain an authoritative ruling and to use that ruling to
mobilize international and domestic public opinion against the Administration’s
Guantanamo policies.
The CCR also brought a federal lawsuit on behalf of several of the detained
prisoners. The Federal District Court and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit ruled unanimously in the government’s favor.325 Nonetheless, the
CCR persisted, and the Supreme Court decided in November to hear its appeal.326
The Guantanamo case has already had an impact. For almost two years now, it
has helped keep the outrageous Guantanamo situation in the public eye and galvanized
international protest. News reports have sparked outrage at keeping the detainees in what
British judges termed a “legal black hole.”327 Amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme
Court from former federal judges, former senior American diplomats, former American
POWs, former judge advocates general of the Navy and a top Marine Corps lawyers, the
bar association representing the 54 nations of the former British Commonwealth, and the
International Bar Association reflected and fanned the widespread protest against the

325

Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002); Al Qaida et al. v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
326
327

124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).

R. v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA
Civ. 1598 at ¶ 66.

-120U.S. Guantanamo policy.328 That protest and the Supreme Court review has compelled
the Administration to release a number of the prisoners.329
The question the case presents before the Supreme Court is very narrow and
involves only whether federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay.330 Thus, at this stage of the
litigation what is being requested of the Court is exceeding minimal: namely a holding
that federal courts have the jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ habeas petitions. On remand,
the District Court will determine what rights, if any, plaintiffs have, and what process, if
any, they are entitled to. At least theoretically, it is quite possible for the Supreme Court
to hold that the lower courts have jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs’ case, but after
remand for the courts to deny their habeas petition.
The Supreme Court’s assertion of jurisdiction to hear the case would be a
tremendous victory for the plaintiffs. First, it would articulate and give meaning to a
fundamental constitutional principle; that Executive detentions of prisoners outside the
United States cannot operate entirely outside the law nor without some legal process.
Moreover, as with Judge Greene’s very different decision in Dellums, the Court’s mere
assertion of jurisdiction in the Guantanamo case would affect governmental conduct.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the Guantanamo case has already had a
dramatic impact on the government’s behavior, leading to the release of many prisoners
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-121and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s decision that some process will be established to
determine whether a prisoner should continue to be detained.331
Finally, the Guantanamo case also illustrates the limitations of litigation to
transform the public dialogue. For some of the lawyers at the Center for Constitutional
Rights, the most fundamental issue involved in the case is the Executive’s use of the
military, wartime paradigm to detain and prosecute people who should be prosecuted
under civilian law. They would want to challenge whether the “war against terrorism”
really fits within the definition of a war, or should Al Qaida be treated as a criminal
conspiracy and its members prosecuted under ordinary civilian war.332 But a challenge in
the Guantanamo case to whether the war against Al Qaida is really a war for
constitutional or international purposes would have almost no chance of success in the
courts, therefore these attorneys are relegated to making that more fundamental point in
their public speaking about the case, and not in the court.
The Guantanamo litigation is but a recent example of the long tradition in this
country of using courts as one arena of protest. That tradition needs to be cherished,
protected and nourished. We should not underestimate the power of the courts and of
litigation to awaken the public’s conscience. The political movements, individual
litigants, judges and lawyers who use courts as a forum for protest play an essential role
in enriching and vitalizing democracy.
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